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MORE THAN FOUR  YEARS have passed since Margaret  Thatcher  took office 
as prime  minister  in June 1979;  and with the election of June 1983, she 
has been given the second term  that she always said  would  be necessary 
to put  into  effect the changes  she planned  for  the British  economy. There 
can be little doubt that the steps taken thus far in the "return  to sound 
money" have marked a significant  turning  point in macroeconomic 
policymaking  in the United Kingdom.  There have been changes in the 
objectives toward which policy is ultimately  directed, changes in how 
the instruments  of policy are  used in practice,  and  a shift  in the strategic 
relation  between the government  and  organized  labor. 
The 1944  White Paper, similar  in spirit  to the U.S. Employment  Act 
of 1946, was interpreted  by most postwar governments  of the United 
Kingdom  as a commitment  to use the policy instruments  at their  disposal 
to pursue high employment, low inflation, economic growth, and a 
sustainable  external  balance. Actual performance  fell far short of such 
plans. and inflation  in particular  proved  an increasingly  severe problem 
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in the late  1960s and 1970s. Observing perhaps that the reach of 
government was exceeding its grasp, Prime Minister Thatcher has 
abandoned  the commitment  to full employment  and has not sought to 
influence  wages and prices by an explicit incomes policy. In pursuit  of 
objectives that include the reduction of inflation as a first priority 
(together  with the creation  of conditions  for a resumption  of sustainable 
growth) "intermediate  financial  targets" are now established and an- 
nounced  for years in advance, and in practice  policy is from  day to day 
directed  at achieving  these intermediate  targets. 
What  explains  these changes  in macroeconomic  policymaking,  in our 
interpretation  of events, is the apparent  desire to achieve a major  shift 
in the strategic  relation  between the government  and  the private  sector, 
organized  labor  in particular.  The 1944  White  Paper,  conceived toward 
the  end  of a major  war  and  after  the experience  of a prolonged  depression, 
effectively  established  rules  for conducting  official  policies;  the policies, 
given appropriate  support from the "social partners" in the private 
sector, were designed  to extend the cooperative  spirit  of the World  War 
II economy and avoid the economic failures of the  1930s. Such a 
cooperative  equilibrium  tends to be inherently  fragile,  however, as each 
party may be tempted to depart from the rules in pursuit of its own 
private  advantage. 
With  the passage  of time, indeed, the incentive  to cooperate  seems to 
have diminished.  Governments  have been accused of manipulating  the 
economy for short-term  electoral  advantage,  for example.  1 And unions 
have increasingly  been inclined  to take employment  for granted,  push 
wages ahead  of productivity,  and  resist the introduction  of new technol- 
ogy and work practices. After the downfall  of prime  ministers  Edward 
Heath and James Callaghan,  who struggled  to contain the pressure  of 
rising  wages while stabilizing  the economy  at a high  level of employment, 
it appears  that Margaret  Thatcher  has decided  to restructure  the frame- 
work within which public and private decisionmakers  operate. The 
government  no longer accepts responsibility  for high employment,  or 
indeed  for any ultimate  objective  other  than  inflation;  it no longer  seeks 
to develop cooperation with the social partners  that have heretofore 
played  a crucial  role (the Trades  Union Congress  and  the Confederation 
1. See William  D. Nordhaus,  "The Political  Business Cycle," Review  of Economic 
Studies,  vol. 42 (April  1975),  pp. 169-90. Willem H.  Buiter and Marcus H.  Miller  307 
of British Industry,  in particular).  The unilateral  announcement  of un- 
conditional  intermediate  targets  for  policy is a signal  of the strategic  shift 
that  we believe the Thatcher  experiment  is designed  to achieve. 
In what  follows we present  a profile  of recent  economic  developments 
in the United Kingdom  and review monetary  and fiscal policy and the 
evolution of taxes and spending  under  the medium-term  financial  strat- 
egy (MTFS).  We then  turn  to consider  three  central  issues. First, how- 
if at all-have  changes  in policy affected  the costs of reducing  inflation? 
Second, has there been a productivity  breakthrough?  And third, does 
the rejection  of a policy of passive accommodation  require  the govern- 
ment  to abandon  stabilization  policy? 
Profile of the Recession 
The dominant  consequences of macroeconomic  policy in the econ- 
omy of the United Kingdom  during  the past two years are a continued 
decline of real  economic activity  during  the first  half  of 1981  followed by 
a slow resumption  of economic growth  in the second half of that year, a 
steady fall in employment  and rise in unemployment,  and a significant 
reduction in the rate of inflation. In 1983 unemployment  peaked and 
inflation  "bottomed out" while the recovery of output continued  at a 
rate  of 2.6 percent  a year (based  on the compromise  estimate  of GDP  in 
the two years since the first half of 1981).  For a sustained  recovery- 
that is, a significant  and lasting  reduction  in the gap between actual  and 
potential  output-  economic growth must remain  above the growth  of 
potential  for some time. Prospects for this are poor given current  and 
announced  future  policy and  the likely development  of world  economic 
activity. 
As shown in figure 1, striking  parallels can be seen between the 
behavior  of GDP,  manufacturing  output,  and  unemployment  of the Great 
Depression  and  that  of the depression  of recent  years. A continuation  of 
these similarities  for the years to come would be most welcome; real 
GDP growth  averaged  4.7 percent during  the five years following 1932 
and unemployment  declined  from a peak of 15.6 percent  in 1932  to 7.8 
percent  in 1937.  We argue  below, however, that the prospects  for such 
a recovery are not good. It is therefore  likely that, by most of the usual 
criteria  (output  growth,  employment  growth,  unemployment  rates), the 308  Brookings Papers  on Economic  Activity, 2:1983 
Figure  1.  Comparison  between  1925-35  and  1975-83, 
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(August  1983), p.  7; the  estimate  of  12.5 for the  1983 unemployment  rate is  the  simple  average  of  the  first nine 
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depression of the  1980s will turn out to  be worse than the Great 
Depression of the 1930s. The impact  of the recent depression  in terms 
of absolute material  deprivation  is less severe, on average, because of 
the much higher  real income base in 1980  and the higher  real value of 
unemployment  compensation. 
The  United  Kingdom  has not been alone  in experiencing  high  inflation 
and rising  unemployment  over the last decade, as can be seen in figure 
2, which also includes the average performance  of the seven largest 
OECD economies. The burst of inflation and the associated rise in 
unemployment  from 1973  to 1978  following the first oil-price increase 
are  clearly  in  evidence, with  the  United  Kingdom  showing  an  exaggerated 
response. The average unemployment  and inflation rates during the 
preceding  decade are included  for purposes  of comparison. 
After 1978 and the second oil-price rise there was another  burst of 
inflation  that has subsided; inflation  is now close to what it was on 
average  before the oil shocks. Once again, the response of the United 
Kingdom  has been exaggerated,  with a bigger surge of inflation  and a 
sharper  increase  in unemployment. 
Economic performance  of the rest of the industrial  world continued 
to worsen  during  1981  and 1982.  Although  the behavior  of the unemploy- 
ment  and  inflation  rates  in the United Kingdom  and  in the nations  of the 
Organization  for Economic Cooperation  and Development as a whole 
(figure  2) suggests a continued  relative worsening  of the United King- 
dom's cyclical position, output in 1982 and 1983 seems to indicate 
improvement  in that position vis a vis its industrial  partners.  Figure 3 
shows the comparative  behavior  of GNP for the United Kingdom  and 
the OECD relative to crude trend paths that are extrapolations  of the 
peak-to-peak  growth achieved between 1973  and 1979  (2.7 percent for 
the  OECD  and 1.4  percent  for  the United  Kingdom).  Although  the annual 
observations  suggest that the United Kingdom  has simply  resumed  this 
low trend  growth in the past two years, the half-year  points indicate a 
more  promising  rate of recovery-2.6  percent a year. Reasons for why 
unemployment  in the United Kingdom  is so high  given its path  of output 
are explored  below. 
The  external  conditions  faced by the economy  of the United  Kingdom 
between 1981  and 1983  have been almost  uniformly  unfavorable.  World 
trade-total and  manufacturing-declined  in 1982,  reflecting  the stagnant 
real  output  in the industrial  countries  just described.  World  real  interest 310  Brookings Papers  on Economic  Activity,  2:1983 
Figure 2.  Unemployment  and Inflation, United Kingdom  and the OECD, 1973-83a 
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a.  The OECD curve  is based on data for the seven  largest countries.  Inflation is measured as the rate of change 
in the GDP (market prices)  deflator for the  United  Kingdom,  France,  and Italy,  and by the  rate of change  of  the 
GNP deflator for the other four countries. 
rates remained  high at 3 to 4 percent, as nominal interest rates and 
inflation  declined  at a similar  rate. Unlike most industrial  countries,  the 
decline  in the real  price  of oil is a mixed  blessing  for  the United  Kingdom, 
which by now is a sizable net exporter of oil. Growth of the world 
economy is unlikely  to provide  a strongly  expanding  source of demand 
for output  from the United Kingdom  in the next few years. The very Willem H. Buiter and Marcus H.  Miller  311 
Figure 3.  Real Gross Product in the United Kingdom and the OECD, 1973-82a 
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Source:  National  Institiute Economic  Review,  no.  105 (August  1983), table 22. 
a.  Figures for the United  Kingdom are for GDP on the expenditure basis at constant  market prices.  Dots  indicate 
data on a half-yearly basis for  1981-82. 
rapid expansion  of the U.S.  economy,  welcome  as it is,  may not con- 
tinue; and even if it does,  the United States now accounts for just under 
20 percent of total OECD imports and exports. 
Monetary  Policy 
In the design of its counterinflationary medium-term financial strategy, 
or MTFS, the government had given pride of place to the attainment of 
restrictive  target growth  rates  for  sterling M3 (denoted  ?M3 here,  a 312  Brookings Papers  on Economic  Activity,  2:1983 
broadly defined domestic monetary aggregate that excludes foreign 
currency  holdings  by residents)  over a four-year  period. As is apparent 
from  figure  4 and table 1, the chosen aggregate  has tended  to overshoot 
these targets and has grown persistently faster than the other major 
monetary aggregates, which are also shown. However, as the figure 
indicates,  this overshooting  of the target  range  has largely  been accom- 
modated  ex post by upward  shifts in the base-point  from which subse- 
quent  ?M3  growth  ranges  apply. 
This evidence raises two obvious questions:  Was money tight after 
all? How credible  is the stance of anti-inflationary  policy based on such 
an aggregate? 
MONEY  SUPPLY  AND  INTEREST  RATES 
Annual financial statements and budget reports published by the 
House of Commons  Treasury  and Civil Service Committee  (hereafter 
Treasury  Committee)  conclude  that  monetary  policy  has  been  restrictive 
since the introduction  of the MTFS, a view essentially  supported  by the 
former  governor  of the Bank of England.  Those who take such a view 
must, however, discount the behavior of the chosen monetary  aggre- 
gate.2 
In presenting  the official view at a recent conference on monetary 
targeting,  John Fforde listed a number  of special factors (including  the 
cyclical flow of funds, changes in saving behavior  in the private  sector 
and in patterns of corporate finance, and structural  changes in the 
financial  system). These, it is argued,  have  rendered  ?M3  a poor  indicator 
of the stance of monetary policy.'  On an earlier occasion,  Jurg Niehans 
described  it as a "distorting  mirror"  and  contended  that  the behavior  of 
the monetary  base would  provide  a better  guide.4  Table 1 shows that  the 
average  growth  rate of the base since 1980  was only one-fourth  of that 
for ?M3. 
It is now evident that even in the first year of the MTFS the official 
2.  Lord Richardson, "British Economic Policy over the Last Decade," Bank of 
England Quarterly Bulletin, vol. 23 (June 1983), pp. 194-99. 
3.  J. S. Fforde,  "Setting Monetary Objectives,"  Bank of England Quarterly Bulletin, 
vol. 23 (June  1983),  pp. 200-08. 
4.  Jurg Niehans, "The Appreciation  of Sterling-Causes,  Effects, and Policies," 
SSRC  Money  Study  Group  Discussion  Paper(New  York:  Social  Science  Research  Council, 
1981). Figure 4.  Money Stock and Liquidity, Target Growth Rates and Actuals, United 
Kingdom,  1979-83a 
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Table 2.  Interest Rates and Inflation, 1975 through 1983:1 
Interest  rates (percent per year) 
Inflation rates (percent 
Bank of  Yield on  change from  one year 
England's  twenty-  earlier) 
minimum  Euro-  year 
lending  Treasury  dollar  British  GDP 
rate  bill  three-  govern-  Retail  deflator 
Year or  (bank  discount  month  ment se-  price  at factor 
quarter  rate)a  ratea  rateb  curitiesc  indexb  cost 
1975  11.00  10.64  5.87  14.39  24.9  27.2 
1976  14.00  13.51  5.06  14.43  15.1  14.1 
1977  7.62  6.29  7.19  12.73  12.1  12.3 
1978  12.50  11.56  11.69  12.47  8.4  11.5 
1979  17.00  15.84  14.50  12.99  19.8  13.4 
1980  14.00  13.13  17.75  13.79  15.1  18.8 
1981  14.50  14.62  13.75  14.75  12.0  10.7 
1982  10.25  9.72  9.25  12.88  5.4  7.0 
1980:1  17.00  16.28  19.94  14.44  19.8  18.0 
2  17.00  15.68  9.75  14.02  21.0  19.8 
3  16.00  14.33  13.94  13.34  15.9  20.1 
4  14.00  13.13  17.75  13.34  15.1  17.7 
1981:1  12.00  11.53  14.88  13.84  12.6  15.2 
2  12.00  11.88  17.69  14.17  11.3  11.5 
3  14.00  15.12  17.88  15.27  11.4  9.4 
4  14.50  14.62  13.75  15.68  12.0  7.2 
1982:1  13.00  12.51  15.47  14.68  10.4  5.6 
2  12.50  12.27  15.66  13.73  9.2  7.8 
3  10.50  9.97  11.50  12.28  7.3  6.5 
4  10.25  9.72  9.25  10.83  5.4  7.8 
1983:1  10.50  10.23  9.69  11.37  4.6  7.8 
Sources:  Bank rate (minimum lending rate) and Treasury bill discount  rate are from National  Institute Economnic 
Review,  no.  103 (February  1983),  table  13,  p.  79,  and  previous  issues.  Other  rates  and  price  indexes  are  from 
Economic  Trends, no.  358 (August  1983), pp. 6, 42, 66, and previous  issues. 
a.  Last Friday of the period. 
b.  Last  month of the period. 
c.  Average  of working days. 
assessment  of financial  conditions  was not based  on the behavior  of ?M3 
relative  to the target.  Twice in 1980  and again  in March  1981  short-term 
interest rates were lowered (see table 2) while ?M3 was well above its 
target range. "On each occasion," John Fforde writes, "it had to be 
judged  that the performance  of M3  required  interpretation  in the light  of 
other indicators, including  the exchange rate, and that the thrust of 
policy was in practice  as restrictive  as had  been intended."5 
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During  the next financial  year, 1981-82, when  ?M3  again  overshot  its 
target growth path, the Treasury nevertheless concluded that "as 
intended, financial  conditions have been moderately  restrictive," and 
cited as evidence  the narrow  aggregates,  the exchange  rate,  asset prices, 
real  interest  rates, and  nominal  GDP.6 
In the 1982-83 financial  year (for which growth ranges of 8 to 10 
percent  had been targeted  for ?M3 and two other monetary  aggregates 
in addition) success in targeting  was achieved partly because of an 
increase  of 2 percentage  points in interest  rates  when the pound  sterling 
weakened  sharply  inNovember 1982.7  In 1983,  withthepoundrecovering 
once again, monetary aggregates  appear  likely to exceed their target 
ranges. 
Also shown in table 2 are short-term  interest  rates, Eurodollar  rates, 
and the domestic inflation rate. Although interest rates have been 
historically  high  under  current  policy, they were evidently  overtaken  by 
Eurodollar  rates in 1981. Furthermore,  for much of the period, and 
especially 1980, interest rates do not seem very high when compared 
with inflation  as measured by the annual rate of change of the GDP 
deflator. 
Before concluding that short-term  pretax real rates were low or 
negative,  it is worth  noting  that  simply  subtracting  the increase  of a price 
index over the past year from the current  three-month  nominal  rate, as 
is the conventional  practice, may not provide  a good measure  of the ex 
ante  short-term  real  rate.  In  a recent  publication  that  made  use of inflation 
expectations from contemporary  private sector forecasts, the pretax 
short-term  real  rate  for private  borrowers  is shown  to be positive in 1980 
and 1981 as well as 1982, averaging  roughly  3, 4, and 6 percent in the 
respective years.8  The evidence of long-term  real rates (available  in the 
market since March 1981, thanks to the issue of indexed government 
debt) suggests a stable market forecast of long-run real rates lying 
between 2 and 3 percent, which is not much  affected  by swings  in short- 
term  real rates. 
6.  Financial  Statement and Budget Report, 1982-83 (London: Her Majesty's Station- 
ery Office, 1983),  p. 14. 
7. The base rate  rose from  9 percent  in early  November  to a high  of 11  percent  at the 
beginning of 1983. See Bank of England Quarterly Bulletin, vol. 23 (March 1983), p. 23. 
8.  "Real  Interest  Rates,"  Bank of England  Quarterly Bulletin,  vol.  22 (December 
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MONETARY  POLICY  AND  THE  EXCHANGE  RATE 
The recent history of nominal  and real exchange  rates in the United 
Kingdom  is shown in table 3.9  For nominal  rates the pattern  since 1979 
has been one of an appreciation  followed by a greater subsequent 
depreciation.  The average  effective rate  of the pound  sterling,  using  the 
International  Monetary  Fund  weights,  rose 10  percent  from  1979  to 1981, 
then fell 5 percent in 1982. Against the U.S.  dollar alone the pound 
sterling  rose by 10 percent  in 1980  but declined  by 25 percent over the 
next two years. By 1983:2  the pound  had  further  declined  against  these 
1982  averages, by 7.1 percent  on the effective rate and by 11.1 percent 
against  the dollar. 
Given  the relatively  high  rates  of inflation  in the United  Kingdom  over 
this period, the overall nominal  depreciation  is not reflected  in the real 
exchange rate. Relative wholesale prices rose by 16 percent  from their 
1979  average  by 1981,  fell only a few percentage  points in the next year, 
and stood about 9 percent higher in 1983:2  than in 1979. There was 
substantially  greater  real  appreciation,  as measured  by unit-labor  costs: 
based on the latest figures in table 3, these stood between 11 and 21 
percent above their 1979 levels (using actual and normalized  costs, 
respectively). 
We offer no complete explanation  of the behavior  of the nominal  and 
real exchange rates in the United Kingdom  since 1979;  indeed, we find 
the decline in competitiveness  puzzling.  The capital  market  equilibrium 
relation among the nominal exchange rate (or the domestic currency 
price of foreign spot exchange), e, the risk premium,  E, the domestic 
nominal  interest  rate, r, and  the foreign  nominal  interest  rate, r*, can be 
expressed  as 10 
Et e(t)  =  r(t)  -  r*(t)  -  e(t) 
or 
(1)  e(t)  -(t) +  Et[r*(s) -  r(s)]ds + 7F E(s)  ds. 
9. In table 3 the nominal  exchange rate is defined, according  to convention  in the 
United  Kingdom,  as the foreign  currency  price  of domestic  currency,  and  the real  rate  is 
defined  accordingly.  In equation  1  here  and  equation  2 below, however,  the exchange  rate 
is defined  according  to the convention  in the United  States. 
10. The expectation  operator,  E, is conditional  on the information  available  at time  t. 
Dots on variables  indicate  their  rates  of change. D~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~C  00  0 
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The  current  nominal  exchange  rate  equals  its long-run  equilibrium  value, 
e(t), plus the integral  of all future expected foreign-domestic  nominal 
interest rate differentials,  plus a residual  that can be interpreted  as the 
integral  of all expected future  risk  premiums. 
Next, defining  c  e  + p* -  p as a measure  of international  price 
competitiveness,  where p and  p* are appropriate  domestic and foreign 
price indexes, we derive 
Etc(t)  =  r(t)  -  Etp(t)  -  [r*(t) -  Ep*(t)  -  E(t) 
or 
(2)  c(t) =  c(t) +  f  Et[r*(s) -  p*(s)  r(s) + p(s)] ds 
+  fE,E(s)  ds. 
The current  real  exchange  rate  equals  its long-run  equilibrium  values, c, 
plus  the integral  of all  future  expected  foreign-domestic  real  interest  rate 
differentials, plus the integral of all future expected exchange risk 
premiums.  1 
Forsyth and Kay, as  well as  others, view  much of the loss  of 
competitiveness since 1979 as the equilibrium  response to such real 
shocks as the growth  of oil production  in the North Sea and  the increase 
in the price  of oil during  OPEC  II and  attribute  a large  part  of the decline 
in c(t) to a decline in c(t). We see no reason to revise our earlier 
conclusion that the effect of North Sea oil on competitiveness was 
relatively  minor,  with a loss of 10  percent  a reasonable  upper  bound.  12 
Overshooting theories, such as those proposed by Rudiger  Dorn- 
busch, emphasize  tight money and its effect on current  and anticipated 
future  real  interest  rate  differentials.  Monetary  growth  deceleration  and 
other anti-inflationary  measures are assumed not to affect long-run 
competitiveness,  c. It  is always  possible  to make  this  approach  consistent 
with the facts by postulating arbitrary  paths for the unobservable 
anticipated  future  real  interest  rate  differentials.  To "explain"  a sudden 
11. Note that  e and  c can only change  unexpectedly. 
12. The low estimate  of Forsyth  and Kay was 8.2 percent.  See J. P. Forsyth  and  J. A. 
Kay, "The Economic Implications  of North Sea Oil Revenues," Working  Paper 10 
(London: Institute  for Fiscal Studies, 1980). Our earliei-  conclusion was presented  in 
Willem  H. Buiter  and  Marcus  Miller,  "The  Thatcher  Experiment:  The First  Two Years," 
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Table 4.  Short-run Real Interest Rates,  1979:1 through 1982:48 
Percent 
World  real 
Real rate  rate minus 
in the  United 
World  United  Kingdom's 
Quarter  real rate  Kingdom  real rate 
1979:1  -  0.29  1.24  -  1.53 
2  0.65  0.73  -0.08 
3  2.07  -0.53  2.60 
4  3.74  -0.76  4.50 
1980:1  4.65  -  1.72  6.37 
2  3.35  -4.12  7.47 
3  1.98  -  5.77  7.75 
4  3.31  -  4.57  7.88 
1981:1  3.63  -3.67  7.30 
2  5.57  0.38  5.19 
3  6.28  5.72  0.56 
4  4.25  7.42  -3.17 
1982:1  4.39  6.91  -  2.52 
2  4.47  4.47  0.00 
3  3.43  3.47  -0.04 
4  3.42  1.92  1.50 
Sources:  Nominal  interest  rates  for  all countries  except  the  United  Kingdom  are from  International Monetary 
Fund,  International  Financial  Statistics,  various  issues;  the  GDP  deflators  are  from  Organization  for  Economic 
Cooperation  and Development,  Maini Econornic Itndicators, various  issues.  Data for the  United  Kingdom are from 
table 2. 
a.  The world interest rate was calculated  as a weighted average of the rates of the United States,  Germany, Japan, 
and France,  with  the  following  weights:  United  States,  0.392;  Germany,  0.225;  Japan,  0.225;  and France,  0.165. 
Nominal  interest rates are the three-month Treasury bill rate for the United States and the United Kingdom and the 
call  rates for the other countries.  Real rates  are the nominal rates  minus the change  in the GDP  deflator over  the 
last four quarters. 
and unexpected 16 percent loss of competitiveness this way would 
require  an increase of 4 percent in expected real interest rates in the 
United Kingdom  relative to those in the rest of the world beginning  in 
1979  and remaining  4 percent  for four years. 
Although competitiveness measured by relative wholesale prices 
declined by 16 percent between 1979 and 1981, table 4 indicates that 
cumulative  ex post real  interest  rates  between 1980  and 1982  were higher 
overseas than in the United Kingdom by an average of more than 3 
percentage points. Ex ante real rates for the United Kingdom are 
understated  for 1980, as discussed above, and it is surely true that the 
rise in world real rates in 1981  was not anticipated  in 1979. But the ex Willem H. Buiter and Marcus H.  Miller  321 
post behavior  of real interest rate differentials  hardly  helps to explain 
the initial  "overshooting"  of the United Kingdom's  real exchange rate 
in 1979. 
The last term  in equation  2 is the residual  or cumulative  risk  premium. 
The  cumulative  current  account  surplus  has  been advanced  as a possible 
explanation  of a bias toward  overvaluation  or lack of competitiveness. 
Seen as a "transfer  problem," however, it is not at all clear why a 
redistribution  of global  wealth should  affect any one country's  compet- 
itive position. Neither the short-run  case (in terms of relative  portfolio 
preferences)  nor the long-run  case (in terms of differences  in marginal 
propensities  to spend  out of wealth  on United Kingdom  goods) has been 
made. In our previous study of the first two years of the Thatcher 
experiment  we mentioned,  but  did  not  attempt  to quantify,  the  possibility 
of portfolio shifts as a partial  explanation  of the overvaluation  of the 
pound  sterling.  We are in the same position  today. 
What does this inability to account satisfactorily  for much of the 
misalignment  of the pound  sterling  imply  for  the assessment  of monetary 
policy? Given that the loss of competitiveness  is not to be attributed  to 
economic  fundamentals-permanent  changes  in the equilibrium  rate or 
temporary  spells of relatively high real interest rates-policymakers 
were faced with options ranging  from adhering  firmly  to the monetary 
targets  whatever  the  consequences  for  interest  rates  and  real  and  nominal 
exchange rates to trying to stabilize exchange rates and sacrificing 
domestic  monetary  targets.  There  is evidence of a compromise  in which 
the broad  money target  was allowed  to overrun  when it could  be shown 
that the strength  of the pound sterling  on the foreign exchanges was 
achieving  many  of the effects on inflation  and  output  that  tight  domestic 
monetary  policy was designed  to achieve. 
Ex ante the government  had  made  an unequivocal  commitment  to the 
domestic monetary targets. In considering responses to alternative 
outcomes  in March  1980  the Treasury  noted: 
To maintain  a progressive  reduction  in monetary  growth  in these circumstances 
[changes  in the domestic  or foreign  environment]  it may  be necessary  to change 
policy in ways not reflected  in the above projections.... 
But there would be no question of departing  from the money supply policy, 
which  is essential  to the success of any anti-inflationary  strategy."3 
13. Financial  Statement and Budget Report, 1980-81 (HMSO,  March  1980),  p. 19. 322  Brookings Papers  on Economic  Activity,  2:1983 
THE  CREDIBILITY  OF  MONETARY  POLICY 
Since the monetary targets have not been observed ex post, how has 
the  government  retained  credibility?  First,  as  explained  above,  the 
overruns were  tolerated in circumstances  in which the exchange  rate 
was behaving as it would have in response  to tight money,  and also in 
cases  in  which  other  indicators  showed  signs  of  financial  restraint. 
Second,  and just  as important, announcing an intermediate monetary 
target in the first place freed the authorities from promises to maintain 
full employment,  positive growth, current balance, and so on and made 
their commitment to preventing inflation more credible. 
In his paper on monetary targeting cited above,  John Fforde is quite 
explicit  about  this  implication  of  adopting  the  intermediate  targets 
expressed  in the government's  counterinflationary strategy. He writes: 
it  would  have  been  possible  to initiate  such  a strategy  with  afamiliar  "Keynesian" 
exposition  about  managing  demand  downwards,  and  with  greater  concentration 
on ultimate  objectives  than  on intermediate  targets.  But this would  have meant 
disclosing  objectives for, inter alia, output  and employment.  This would have 
been a very hazardous  exercise, and the objectives would either have been 
unacceptable to public opinion or else inadequate to secure a substantial 
reduction  in the rate  of inflation,  or both. Use of strong  intermediate  targets,  for 
money  supply  and  government  borrowing,  enabled  the authorities  to stand  back 
from  output  and employment  as such and  to stress the vital part  to be played  in 
respect  of these  by the  trend  of industrial  costs. In  short,  whatever  the  subsequent 
difficulties  of working  with intermediate  targets,  they were vitally  important  at 
the outset in order to signal a decisive break with the past and enable the 
authorities  to set out with  presentational  confidence  upon  a relatively  uncharted 
sea.  14 
The third explanation of how credibility has been maintained follows 
logically.  It has been  argued that the adoption of intermediate targets 
involved  the implicit rejection of the 1944 White Paper commitment to 
maintain high employment  through Keynesian  demand management. 
But  one  may  go  further  and  argue  that  it  was  this  aspect  of  the 
counterinflationary strategy that was more important than the details of 
the  monetary  policy  itself.  This  point  is  also  made  explicit  in John 
Fforde's presentation: 
the difficulties  that  have come to seem inherent  in short-term  monetary  targetry 
are by no means fatal to the associated counterinflationary  strategy  once its 
14. Fforde, "Setting  Monetary  Objectives,"  p. 207. Willem H.  Buiter and Marcus H.  Miller  323 
practical  credibility  can be established  by the perceived  behavior  of policy in 
response to the developing  and disinflationary  economic situation. For what 
matters  is the refusal of the authorities  to stimulate  demand  in "Keynesian" 
fashion, or to "reflate," as conditions develop that would in the past have 
justified  and  provoked  such  a response.  The fact that  the monetary  targets  have 
not concurrently  been met, or that the meaning  of particular  developments  in 
this or that  aggregate  has become  very ambiguous,  is of much  less importance."5 
Indeed, we would argue that the intermediate targets for the govern- 
ment deficit (as measured by the public sector borrowing requirement, 
the PSBR) that were initially put in place to support the monetary targets 
have,  in practice,  prevented  the operation of Keynesian  stabilization 
policy and have thus played a crucial role in sustaining the credibility of 
the  anti-inflationary policy  in the face  of  rising unemployment.  This 
argument is developed  in the next section. 
Fiscal Policy and the Medium-Term  Financial Strategy 
Fiscal policy in the United Kingdom since  1980 has been powerfully 
influenced  by  the  explicit  medium-term  strategy  for reducing public 
sector borrowing as a percentage of GDP. To adhere to preannounced 
targets  for  borrowing  has  involved  taking  discretionary  actions  to 
counteract the built-in stabilizers  that tend to increase  the deficit in a 
slump and lower it in a boom. 
THE  PSBR:  TARGETS  AND  OUTCOMES 
Table 5 shows the targets for the PSBR as a percent of GDP at market 
prices. The projections embodied in the MTFS as it was first launched 
in the 1980 budget is given in the first row; entries decrease steadily from 
3.8 percent in 1980-81 to 1.5 percent in 1983-84. 
The actual outcome  for 1980-81,  5.6 percent,  shows  a considerable 
overshooting  of the target (though,  as we  argue below,  the resulting 
fiscal  stance  was  still  contractionary  given  the  slump in output  and 
employment).  In the second  row, the budget for fiscal 1981, the target 
figures were revised upward, and there have been subsequent upward 
revisions in the last two budgets also. The tendency to revise the targets 
15. Ibid. 324  Brookings Papers  on Economic  Activity,  2:1983 
Table 5.  Targets and Outcomes for the Public Sector Borrowing Requirement, 
Financial Years 1980-81  through 1985-86 
Percent of GDP at market prices 
Item  1980-81  1981-82  1982-83  1983-84  1984-85  1985-86 
Targets 
1980-81  budget  3.8  3.0  2.3  1.5  ...  ... 
1981-82  budget  ...  4.3  3.3  2.0  ...  ... 
1982-83  budget  ...  ...  3.5  2.8  2.0 
1983-84 budget  ...  ...  ...  2.8  2.5  2.0 
Outcomes  5.6  3.4  3.4a  2.5a  1  .9a 
Sources:  Targets  are from  United  Kingdom,  Finatncial Statement  atnd Buidget Report,  1980-81  (Her  Majesty's 
Stationery Office,  1981) and successive  issues.  Actuals for 1980-81  and 1981-82 are from Economic  Tretnds,  no. 358 
(August  1983), pp.  6,  54; forecasts  for  1982-83  to  1985-86  are from Natiotnal Itnstituite  Economic  Review,  no.  104 
(May  1983), p. 20, and from Finianicial  Statemetnt atnd  Buidget Report,  1983-84  (HMSO,  1983), p. 9. 
a.  Forecast. 
successively upward  has been partly offset, however, by an "under- 
shooting"  of those revised  targets  in the past  three  years. (Thus  in 198  1- 
82, for example, the target  was raised  from 3 percent  to 4.3 percent  but 
the actual outcome was 3.4 percent.) This is evidence in part of the 
increasing  effect of cash limits in planning  public  sector spending:  after 
1982-83, the government  expenditure  and financing  plans are all ex- 
pressed in cash terms with little indication  of the real implications  of 
such plans.  16 Overall  the designers  of the MTFS could be satisfied  with 
the results shown in the last row (including  estimates  for future  years). 
Starting  from a higher  level than  anticipated,  the PSBR as a percentage 
of GDP has been brought  down by more than 2 percentage  points thus 
far and  is forecast to fall by another  I1/2  points by 1984-85. 
THE  DEFICIT  AND  THE  EFFECTS  OF  THE  CYCLE 
The actual financial  balance in the public sector as a percentage  of 
GDP during  the last five financial  years is shown at the top of table 6 
(first  column). The deficit of almost 5 percent of GDP recorded  by the 
previous  Labour  party  administration  in 1978-79  was almost  halved  by 
1982-83;  but the conflict  between the Tories' plans  to reduce  the deficit 
and the pressure exerted on them by the built-in  stabilizers  (lower tax 
receipts  and  higher  transfer  payments)  is also evident  from  the series. In 
1980-81, which happened  to be both the first  year of the MTFS and of 
16. See John  A. Kay, The  1982  Bludget (Blackwells,  1982),  chap. 8, pp. 100-08. Willem  H.  Buiter  and  Marcus  H.  Miller  325 
Table 6.  Actual and Cyclically Adjusted Financial Balance for Different Aggregations 
of the Public Sector,  1978-83 
Percent of GDP at market prices 
Cyclically  adjusted  Change  budget changea 
from 
Actual  previous  Built-in  United 
Sector  and year  balance  year  stabilizer  Kingdom  OECDb 
Public sector 
(financial years) 
1978-79  -4.9  ...  ......  ... 
1979-80  -  3.9  1.0  0.1  0.9  ... 
1980-81  -5.1  -  1.2  -3.1  1.9  ... 
1981-82  -2.6  2.6  -  1.9  4.5  ... 
1982-83  -3.2  -0.6  -0.7  0.1 
Sum of changes  . ..  1.8  -  5.6  7.4  ... 
Sum of weighted 
changesc  ...  0.2  -  3.4  3.7  ... 
General government 
(calendar years) 
1979  - 3.1  ...  ...  ...  ... 
1980  -3.2  -0.1  -  1.0  0.9  0.1 
1981  -  2.0  1.2  -  2.2  3.4  0.6 
1982  -  2.0  0.0  -  1.2  1.2  0.0 
1983  -2.1  -0.1  -0.6  0.5  0.3 
Sum of changes  ...  1.0  -  5.0  6.0  1.0 
Central government 
(calendar years) 
1979  -  5.3  ...  ...  ...  ... 
1980  -4.9  0.4  -  1.8  2.2  0.1 
1981  -4.1  0.8  -2.0  2.8  0.2 
1982  -2.8  1.3  -0.4  1.7  0.1 
1983  -  2.7  0.1  -0.2  0.3  -0.4 
Sum of changes  ...  2.6  -4.4  7.0  0.0 
Sources: The public sector balance is from Econiomic Trends, no. 358 (August  1983), pp. 6, 58; stabilizers are from 
National  Institiute Economnic  Review,  no.  103 (February  1983), p. 8; general government  data are from Organization 
for Economic  Cooperation  and Development,  OECD Economnic Oiutlook (OECD,  December  1982), pp.  23-24;  and 
central government  data are from International Monetary Fund,  World Economic  Oiutlook (IMF,  1983), p. 219. 
a.  Second  column minus third column. 
b.  Seven  largest countries. 
c.  The  concept  of  demand-weighted  deficit  is  intended  to  show  the  "first round"  effect  of  the  budget  on  GDP 
after allowing for savings  and imports  leakages.  See  National  Institiute Economnic  Review!,  no.  99 (February  1982), 
p. 95. 
the current slump, the measured deficit rose by a little more than 1 
percent of GDP. (The year-to year changes are shown in the second 
column.) 
A clearer picture of the effect of falling tax revenues and rising 
unemployment  benefits on the finances  of the public  sector is shown in 326  Brookings  Papers on Economic  Activity, 2:1983 
the third  column, which presents  the "cyclical adjustments"  computed 
by the National Institute  of Economic and Social Research. For 1980- 
81 alone the effect of the stabilizers is 3.1 percent of GDP, and the 
cumulated  total between 1979-80 and 1982-83 is more than 5 percent. 
To register  declines in the actual deficit  against  such pressures  for it to 
increase automatically  required  a marked  contraction  in fiscal policy; 
and  the last column,  when  cumulated,  shows that  the cyclically  adjusted 
deficit  was reduced  by more  than  7 percent. 
Estimates  of cyclically adjusted  deficits  are highly  dependent  on the 
assumed  trend  growth  of potential  GDP, which  the National  Institute  of 
Economic and Social Research calculated to be 2.5 percent; but the 
same  general  picture  emerges  from  calculations  for the financial  balance 
of general government-that is, excluding  public  corporations-carried 
out by the OECD  and for the balance  of the central government  carried 
out by the International  Monetary Fund. Their figures, for calendar 
years, are shown in table 6. They also allow some comparison  to be 
made between fiscal policy in the United Kingdom  and the average  of 
the seven largest  OECD  economies. 
The OECD series for the financial  balance  of the United Kingdom's 
general government has a  smoother profile, and shows an overall 
reduction of  1 percent between calendar years 1979 and 1983. The 
cumulated  effect of the built-in  stabilizers  is 5 percent of GDP, which 
yields a shift of 6 percentage  points to surplus  in the cyclically adjusted 
financial  balance (see the fourth  column).  For the seven largest  OECD 
economies, including  the United Kingdom  and  two other  countries  that 
were implementing  medium-term  strategies  to reduce  their  deficits, the 
shift  to surplus  in their  high-employment  deficits  was only 1 percent. 
As the OECD was collectively moving into recession, all countries 
experienced upward  pressure from the built-in stabilizers  that, taken 
collectively, they did not offset, allowing  the weighted  average  deficit  to 
increase by 2.4 percent according  to OECD estimates. However, the 
United Kingdom, which experienced one of the sharpest recessions, 
more  than  offset the effect of the stabilizers,  as we have shown. 
The  International  Monetary  Fund's  figures  for  the  central government 
financial  balance show much the same overall profile as the OECD 
calculations  just discussed (see table 6). The move to a surplus  of 2.6 
percent of GNP over the period shown in the second column was 
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was a 4.4 percent shift toward deficit. The cyclically adjusted  budget 
change is thus a 7 percent shift to surplus-what  the International 
Monetary  Fund calls a 7 percent  negative  fiscal impulse-over  the four 
calendar  years 1980  to 1983.17  For the seven largest  OECD  countries  the 
corresponding  fiscal  impulse  for these years is precisely  zero, as shown 
in the last column. 
All three sets of figures  in table 6 from separate sources covering, 
respectively,  the public  sector, general  government,  and  central  govern- 
ment suggest that fiscal policy in the United Kingdom  under  the MTFS 
has been contractionary-much more contractionary,  it would appear, 
than  the average  of the largest  seven OECD  countries. 
By Keynesian principles  of the determination  of aggregate  demand 
and output, the depth of the depression  in the United Kingdom  can be 
partly explained by the tight fiscal stance induced by the MTFS. But 
according  to those principles,  it would not be correct  to use the shift in 
the cyclically adjusted  deficit  itself as a measure  of the impact  of public 
spending and taxation on aggregate demand. For this purpose it is 
conventional  to "demand  weight" the items in the balance;  the changes 
in the demand-weighted  balance  are given in the seventh row of table 6. 
According  to these figures, the substantial  move toward surplus  in 
the unadjusted  deficit had little effect on the demand-weighted  deficit, 
which hardly changed during the period from 1978-79 to  1982-83, 
according  to the National Institute  of Economic and Social Research. 
But the built-in stabilizers, by these figures, would have added 3.4 
percent to demand had they been allowed to operate. The resulting 
estimate of the cumulated  change in the cyclically adjusted, weighted 
deficit  is 3.7 percent, as shown in the fourth  column, half the figure  for 
the unweighted  equivalent. 
This quantitative  conclusion, that the demand  effect of the govern- 
ment's spending  and  tax program  has fallen  almost  4 percent  behind  the 
potential  growth  of the economy, depends  on the 2.5 percent  growth  of 
potential assumed by the National Institute of Economic and Social 
Research. But cutting back the assumed potential growth rate by  1 
percentage  point would still leave the result  that  the government's  fiscal 
stance has effectively removed about 3 percent from demand in the 
economy. 
17.  International Monetary Fund, World  Economic  Outlook (IMF, 1983), p. 110. 328  Brookings Papers  on Economic  Activity,  2:1983 
Table 7.  Adjusting the Public Sector Financial Deficit to Reflect 
the "True"  Cost of Debt Service,  1979-82 
Percent of GDP at market prices unless  otherwise  specified 
Item  1979  1980  1981  1982  Average 
Public sector financial deficit  4.3  4.7  3.5  2.9  3.9 
Interest cost  4.1  4.3  4.6  4.5  4.4 
True cost  of debt service  0.5  0.5  0.6  0.7  0.6 
Implied adjustmenta  3.0  3.2  3.3  3.1  3.2 
Adjusted public sector  deficitb  1.3  1.5  0.2  -0.2  0.7 
Memoranda 
Public sector net liabilities  40.1  37.7  38.4  38.4  38.6 
Bank of England's  inflation 
adjustments  7.5  5.4  4.8  n.a.  ... 
Real long-run interest rate, 
percent per yearc  2.5  2.5  2.5  2.9  ... 
Sources:  Public sector deficit and GDP are from Economnic  Tretnds,  no. 358 (August  1983), pp. 6, 58; net liabilities, 
inflation adjustments  by  the  Bank  of  England,  and interest  cost  before  1982 are from Batnk of Etngland Quiarterly 
Bulletin,  vol.  22 (June  1982), pp.  241-42;  interest  cost  for  1982 is the  authors'  estimate;  and the true cost  is from 
Marcus Miller and Simon  Babbs,  "The True Cost  of Debt  Service  and the Public Sector  Financial Deficit,"  paper 
presented at the Association  of  University  Teachers  of Economics  Conference,  Oxford,  England,  April 1983, table 
6. The real long-run interest  rate for  1981-82  is from Fitnancial Tirmes,  various issues. 
n.a.  Not  available. 
a.  Calculated as 85 percent of interest cost,  assuming a  15 percent average tax rate, minus the true cost. 
b.  The financial deficit minus the adjustment. 
c.  Data for  1979-80 are assumed  to be the same as for  1981. 
In the light of this evidence it is not so surprising  to see the economy 
falling  about  7 percent  below the trend  prevailing  from 1973  to 1982  (see 
figure  3). 
ADJUSTING  FOR  INFLATION 
The public sector deficit includes a substantial  volume of interest 
payments. With  high inflation  and net monetary  liabilities  of the public 
sector averaging  almost 40 percent of GDP during  the past four years, 
interest  payments  have been more than  4 percent of GDP, as shown in 
the second row of table 7, while the public sector financial  deficit as a 
whole, shown in the first row, averaged 3.9 percent in the last four 
calendar  years. 
In times of inflation, however, nominal interest transfers do not 
measure  the "real" interest  cost of borrowing,  and  the Bank  of England 
publishes a series of inflation  adjustments  that may be applied to the 
nominal  interest  series. The  effect of using  these adjustments  is, roughly, 
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varied  substantially  over the past few years, however, the cost of debt 
service is probably  better measured  by using a long-term  rate; and the 
floating  of some long-term  dated indexed stock in 1981  now provides 
data  on long-term  real rates (see the memoranda  in table  7). 
It may seem paradoxical  to combine  the multiplier,  whose existence 
depends on current disposable income having an effect on current 
consumption  demand over and above its contribution  to permanent 
income, with a smoothed, permanent,  real debt-service concept. The 
reason  is that we believe permanent  real interest  income, as calculated 
in the table, is a better approximation  of the actual flow of disposable 
interest  income to the ultimate  wealth-owning  and spending  units than 
the uncorrected  figures  or  the figures  corrected  only  for current  inflation. 
This is because most government  debt is held by institutional  investors 
such  as pension  funds  with  long time  horizons  and  superior  access to the 
capital  markets.  They effectively transform  the volatile  series of current 
interest income and capital gains into a much smoother series of 
disbursements  to the ultimate  wealth owners. No similar  private  insti- 
tutions exist for smoothing  out factor incomes, and the stabilizing  role 
of the government  consists to a large  extent in using  its tax-transfer  and 
borrowing  powers to keep private  disposable  income  in line with  (poten- 
tial)  private  permanent  income. 
With  long-run  real rates of less than 3 percent, the after-tax  "true" 
cost of debt service estimated  in the third  row of table  7 averages  only a 
little over 0.5 percentage point of GDP, rising to 0.7 point over the 
period. The adjustment  (fourth row) that this implies for measured 
interest  payments  is fairly  constant  at about  3 percentage  points  of GDP. 
The "real" public sector financial  deficit, having been adjusted  to 
reflect  this long-run  measure  of the cost of debt service, is shown in the 
fifth  row. It has the same trend  as the conventional  PSFD (first  row)  but 
is centered  around  a position of budget  balance:  instead  of falling  from 
about  5 percentage  points of GDP to just under  3 points, the real deficit 
moves from 1.3 points of GDP to a surplus  of 0.2 in 1982.  Because the 
adjustments  in the table are fairly constant, a cyclically adjusted  real 
deficit  would show the same pattern  as the measured  deficit  discussed 
above, though  at a lower level. 
The message conveyed by these estimates of real deficits is clear 
enough.  Pursuing  a medium-term  strategy  for reducing  nominal  deficits 
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Table 8.  The Tax Burden since 1978 
Percent 
Marginal 
Tax rate on employees'  direct tax 
Average  average  earningsb  rate of 
tax  married 
Year  burdena  Average  Marginal  couplec 
1978  34.11  47.0  54.6  33.6 
1979  34.93  48.0  55.1  30.1 
1980  36.32  49.0  55.4  30.2 
1981  38.54  51.5  56.9  31.0 
1982  39.50  51.4  57.3  32.4 
1983  n.a.  51.2  57.5  33.2 
Sources:  Average  tax burden is from Ecotnomic Tretnds, no.  358 (August  1983), pp. 6,  58; all other data are from 
A.  W.  Dilnot  and C.  N.  Morris,  "The  Tax  System  and Distribution  1978-83,"  Fiscal  Studies,  vol.  4 (May  1983), 
tables 2 and 3, p. 59. 
a.  Direct and indirect taxes,  national insurance contributions,  and so on as a percentage of GDP at market prices, 
expenditure estimate. 
b.  Direct and indirect taxes,  national insurance contfibutions,  and so on as a percentage of gross income (including 
employers'  national insurance contribution). 
c.  Marginal rate of income  tax plus employees'  national insurance contributions for a married couple  in the basic- 
rate band. 
recession  has involved "balancing  the budget"  in real  terms  on average, 
with a trend  movement  into surplus. 
THE  TAX  BURDEN 
Since  the last  full  year  under  a Labour  government  in 1978,  the  burden 
of taxes in the United Kingdom  has risen markedly.  The first  column  of 
table 8 shows how a macroeconomic  index of the average tax burden 
(total direct plus indirect  taxes and national  insurance  contributions  as 
a proportion  of GDP) rises by 5.4 percentage  points between 1978  and 
1982.  The second and third  columns  give the total (direct  plus indirect) 
average and marginal  tax rates of an employee on average earnings. 
These microeconomic  measures  rise over the same five-year  period  by 
4.4 and 2.7 percentage  points, respectively. Although  marginal  direct 
tax rates have been lowered significantly  for the wealthy, the picture  is 
different for persons with average incomes, as  the fourth column 
indicates. The overall progressivity  of the tax system has declined.18 
Most of the increase is accounted for by higher value-added  tax and 
18. See A. W. Dilnot  and  C. N. Morris,  "The  Tax System  and  Distribution  1978-83," 
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Table 9.  Public Expenditure According to Successive Plans, 1978-79  to 1985-86 
Indexes,  1978-79  =  100 unless  otherwise  specified 
Item  1978-79  1979-80  1980-81  1981-82  1982-83  1983-84  1984-85  1985-86 
Total  expenditurea 
March  1980  100.0  99.6  99.6  98.7  96.5  95.8  ...  ... 
March  1981  100.0  101.5  105.6  105.3  103.6  100.7  ... 
March  1982  100.0  101.0  103.6  106.3  107.3  105.7  105.3  ... 
February  1983  100.0  101.0  103.3  105.7  106.1  107.0  107.4  107.9 
Memoranda 
Public  expendi- 
tureb  41.0  40.5  43.0  44.5  44.0  ...  ...  ... 
Market  price 
GDP  100.0  101.4  98.4  97.1  99.7  ...  ... 
Sources:  Cost  indexes  are from  Government's  Expetnditure Planis 1983-84  to  1985-86,  Third Report from  the 
House  of  Commons  Treasury  and  Civil  Service  Committee,  sess.  1982-83  (HMSO,  1983), p.  24; ratios are from 
Government's Expenditure Plans  1983-84  to 1985-86,  presented  to Parliament by the Chancellor of the Exchequer, 
Cmnd. 8789, vol.  I (HMSO,  1983), p. 9; and GDP is from Economic  Trends, no.  358 (August  1983), p. 6. 
a.  Includes net debt interest. 
b.  As a percentage  of GDP at market prices. 
other indirect  taxes, although  employees' national  insurance  contribu- 
tions  have  also risen  sharply.  The  increase  in  the tax  burden  in  the United 
Kingdom  stands in sharp  contrast  to the large  tax cuts implemented  by 
the Reagan  administration.  This contrast  extends to the overall stance 
of budgetary  policy, which  is expansionary  in the United  States  but  very 
contractionary  in the United Kingdom. 
PUBLIC  EXPENDITURE:  PLANS,  PERFORMANCE,  AND  PROSPECTS 
The failure  to reduce  public  expenditure  as planned  has already  been 
noted in discussing successive modifications  to the MTFS. In what 
follows we look at this "failure" in more detail to identify how the 
overshooting of planned spending came about. We briefly go on to 
describe  and  criticize  the conclusions  now apparently  being  drawn  from 
this experience  about  the prerequisites  for fiscal  balance  over the longer 
term. 
In table 9,  reproduced from evidence supplied to  the Treasury 
Committee  by Terry  Ward,  public spending  in real terms with 1978-79 
as a base is shown as envisaged by successive plans and embodied  in 
annual  White Papers. The first public expenditure  White Paper  of the 
Conservative  government,  published  in March 1980, anticipated  a de- 
cline of total expenditure  to 95.8 percent of this base by 1983-84. The 
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total  for 1983-84  that  is 12  percent  higher,  that  is, 100.2  relative  to base. 
Ward  notes the marked  tendency  for the cost offuture expenditure  to be 
revised  upward  year  after  year;  it is also apparent  that  actual  expenditure 
has tended  to undershoot  such revised  plans.  19 
The ratio  of public  expenditure  to GDP  is by convention,  but  without 
economic foundation,  used as a bench mark  of the weight imposed by 
the public  sector on the economy, and  the relevant  ratio  is shown in the 
memoranda  in the table. Public expenditure  failed to fall at about 1 
percent  a year over the four financial  years to 1982-83 (as envisaged in 
the first  White  Paper),  but  rather  rose at a rate  of 1.5 percent  a year  over 
the period. This, together  with no growth  in GDP over the base year, 
has pushed  the ratio  of true  expenditures  to GDP  up 3 percentage  points 
from  41 percent  to an estimated  44 percent  in 1982-83. 
By comparing  initial  plans with resulting  outcomes (to 1982-83)  for 
the individual  programs  that  make  up the planning  total, one can identify 
three main  areas in which spending  substantially  overshot: social secu- 
rity, which includes  the cost of unemployment  benefits  and supplemen- 
tary  benefits;  expenditure  for industry,  energy, trade,  and  employment, 
which includes industrial  support and special employment  measures; 
and the rise in lending  to nationalized  industries.  Defense spending  did 
not overshoot noticeably, despite the Falkland  Islands campaign.  The 
message that emerges from this examination  is that a major  recession 
whose depth, length, and employment  consequences were underesti- 
mated had the effect of increasing  public spending  on unemployment 
compensation,  industrial  support,  and  employment  measures  and  raising 
the borrowing  needs of nationalized  industries. 
To those of a Keynesian persuasion  these are manifestations  of the 
automatic stabilizers at work that would hardly be looked upon as 
reasons for treating  the actual course of public spending  as a failure  of 
policy. The  Thatcher  government  has, of course, condoned  the  observed 
increases; but it now is apparently  aiming  to reverse these increases in 
order  to cut taxes. 
If the economy were to regain  its 1978-79  utilization  of potential,  the 
rise  in  the  expenditure  ratio  would,  by and  large,  vanish.  But  the  objective 
of policy is not to achieve such output targets:  it is directed  at "ensuring 
the conditions  for sustainable  growth," not at utilization  or unemploy- 
19.  Memorandum by Terry Ward, appendix  1 to Government's  Expenditure Plans 
1983-84  to 1985-86,  Third  Report  from  the House  of Commons  Treasury  and  Civil  Service 
Committee  (hereafter  Treasury  Committee),  sess. 1982-83  (HSMO,  1983),  pp. 17-24. Willem H. Buiter and Marcus H.  Miller  333 
ment rates. What  then are the prospects  for the future  of public  expen- 
diture? Some indications of official thinking have recently been re- 
vealed.20  It appears  to be assumed that, without a major  policy shift, 
public  expenditure  in real terms will continue  for the rest of the decade 
to grow at more or less the same rate as that observed in table 9-that 
is, roughly 1.5 percent a year, including  debt interest, with unemploy- 
ment  staying  at 3 million  if GDP  growth  is low but  falling  to 2 million  by 
1990  if economic growth is high. Official  real expenditure  projections 
are, surprisingly,  not very sensitive to the difference  in unemployment 
in these two scenarios. A high  annual  growth  rate-3  percent  from  now 
until the end of the decade-ensures  that the public expenditure  ratio 
falls to 40 percent by the end of the decade. A low growth rate-0.5 
percent  a year-by  contrast  will push the ratio  up to almost  47 percent 
by the end of the decade. 
The second Thatcher government wants to restrict the PSBR to 
about  2 percent  of GDP and to reduce taxes if possible. To do this, two 
"structural"  solutions  are currently  being  examined.  The first,  which is 
to a large  extent cosmetic, is "privatization,"  selling  a majority  interest 
in industrial  activities of the public sector. The proceeds of such sales 
would  reduce  the  PSBR,  and  the spending  and  borrowing  of the  privatized 
industry  would not count as public  expenditure.  The second policy shift 
being considered is to reduce the size and extent of the welfare state. 
This  is  potentially much more  significant as  it  would involve  a 
diminution  of the government's  involvement  in the health, education, 
and  welfare  transfer  programs  that currently  constitute  over 50 percent 
of the program  total.21 
Inflation and Unemployment 
The first priority  in the design of macroeconomic  policy since 1979 
has been the reduction  of inflation  without  explicit recourse  to incomes 
20. See, for example,  David  Blake, "Has the Think  Tank  Got It Wrong  about  Public 
Spending?"  The  Times,  November  8, 1982. 
21. The official  argument  that radical  cuts in spending  may be financially  inevitable 
has been, however, challenged  both because of its narrow  focus on the PSBR and its 
statistical  assumptions.  See Willem H. Buiter, "The Theory of Optimum  Deficits and 
Debt," Discussion  Paper  (London  School of Economics,  Centre  for Labour  Economics, 
forthcoming);  and  the report  discussed  in "The Crisis  that  Never Was," The  Economist, 
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Table 10.  Wage and Price Inflation, 1978 to 1983:1 
Percenta 
Average  GDP 
earnings,  Retail  Tax and  deflator at  Real  con-  Real 
entire  price  price  factor  sumption  product 
Quarter  economy  index  index  cost  earningsb  earningsc 
1978:4  13.8  8.1  3.8  10.9  10.0  2.9 
1979:1  13.9  9.6  6.6  10.2  7.3  3.7 
2  13.4  10.6  12.9  12.6  0.5  0.8 
3  15.7  16.0  13.6  13.9  2.1  1.8 
4  18.5  17.2  14.9  16.6  3.6  1.9 
1980:1  19.7  19.1  16.8  18.0  2.9  1.7 
2  21.4  21.5  18.0  19.8  3.4  1.6 
3  22.2  16.4  17.8  20.1  4.4  2.1 
4  19.5  15.3  16.6  17.7  2.9  1.8 
1981:1  16.5  12.7  13.5  15.2  3.0  1.3 
2  13.0  11.7  15.2  11.5  -  2.2  1.5 
3  11.4  11.2  14.7  9.4  -  3.3  2.0 
4  11.1  11.9  15.5  7.2  -  4.4  3.9 
1982:1  11.1  11.1  14.6  5.6  -  3.5  5.5 
2  10.1  9.4  9.7  7.8  0.4  2.3 
3  8.5  8.0  8.8  6.5  -  0.3  2.0 
4  7.7  6.2  6.7  7.8  1.0  -0.1 
1983:1  8.8  4.9  5.2  7.8  3.6  1.0 
Sources: Economnic  Trends, no. 358 (August  1983), pp. 5, 6, 40, 42, and similar tables in Economic  Trenids:  Anltll(tl 
Suipplement, 1983 Editioni. 
a.  Percent changes  are from same quarter one  year earlier. 
b.  Change in average earnings minus change  in tax price index. 
c.  Change in average earnings minus change  in the GDP deflator. 
policy. The course of recent  wage and  price  inflation  is given in table 10. 
In pursuit of this objective the government has apparently  dropped 
high employment  as an avowed short- and medium-term  objective of 
policy, and  unemployment  has grown  at an alarming  rate. 
Figure 5 shows both inflation and unemployment  for the period 
immediately  before the election of June 1979  and in the interval  since 
then. With  the breakdown  of incomes  policy in 1978,  inflation  increased 
in the first two quarters  of 1979;  but the year-to-year  increase in retail 
prices then exhibited  a sharp  rise for four quarters  and peaked  at more 
than  20 percent  in 1980:2.  The value-added  tax increase  in the June  bud- 
get of 1979  was estimated  to have added  4 percentage  points  to the retail 
price index for 1979:3  and, because this remains  in year-to-year  figures 
for four quarters,  it would account  for most of the sharp  increase  in that 
quarter,  and for the sharp  decrease one year later. Inflation  has fallen 
steadily  since from  its peak  of 21.5 percent  in early 1980. Willemn H.  Buiter  and  Marcus  H.  Miller  335 
Figure  5.  Inflation  and Unemployment  in the United  Kingdom,  1977:1  through  1983:3 
Retail price  index  Unemployment  rate 
(percent change from previous year)  (percent) 
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Source: Economic  Trends, no.  358 (August  1983), pp. 36, 42. 
a.  The change  in the basis for counting  the unemployed  was carried out in October  1982. The series  for the new 
basis as shown  is from an earlier date,  however,  to highlight its increasing divergence  from the old series. 
Unemployment  has, on the other hand, risen without a break since 
1979:2  to levels without precedent in the United Kingdom since the 
1930s.  Thus  from  a plateau  of between  5 and  6 percent  in 1977-78,  which 
was a record  for  the United  Kingdom  after  World  War  II, unemployment 
doubled  by late 1981  and has gone on rising since then. Because of a 
subsequent  shift in the basis of measurement,  from  those registering  as 
unemployed to those claiming benefits, the old series is no longer 
continued;  but  the new series shows the same  pattern,  at a slightly  lower 
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Table 11.  Output, Unemployment, and Inflation, 1979-83 
Item  1979  1980  1981  1982  1983  Sum 
GDP (index,  1975 =  100) 
Trend of  1.6 percenta  110.7  112.4  114.3  116.2  118.1  ... 
Actual  110.7  108.0  105.4  106.1  108.2b  .  .  . 
Gap (percent)  0  3.9  7.8  8.7  8.4b  28.8 
Unemploymentc 
Number (millions)  1.2  1.6  2.4  2.8  3.0b 
Rate (percent)  5.1  6.4  10.0  11.7  12.5b  .  .  . 
"Bulge'  d  0  1.3  4.9  6.6  7.4b  20.2 
Inflation (percent growth)e  13.4  18.0  11.9  8.6  4.6b  ... 
Sources:  GDP at factor cost,  average  estimate,  unemployment,  and inflation are from Econiomic Trends, no.  358 
(August  1983),  pp.  6,  36,  42.  Forecast  of  GDP  at  factor  cost,  compromise  estimate,  is  from  United  Kingdom, 
Financial  Statement  and Biudget Report,  1983-84  (HMSO,  1983), pp.  18-20; the forecast  of unemployment  is from 
Government's  Public  Expendituire Plans  1983-84  to  1985-86,  presented  to  Parliament  by  the  chancellor  of  the 
exchequer,  Cmnd. 8789, vol.  2 (HMSO,  1983), p. 65.  Number of unemployed  in millions is converted  to rate using 
1982 labor  force  data.  The  forecast  of  inflation  is  from  the  government's  Autumn  Statemenit (H.M.  Treasury, 
November  1983), p.  17, and Economic  Trenids, no.  360 (October  1983), p. 42. 
a.  Average of high (2.5) and low (0.75) growth trend considered  by the government  in forecasting  public spending 
in the first half of the  1980s. 
b.  Forecast. 
c.  Excluding  school  leavers  and counted  on the basis of claims. 
d.  Increase  relative to  1979 rate. 
e.  Percent increase  in general index of retail prices from same quarter one  year earlier. 
Table 11 shows that the number  of unemployed  (excluding  school 
leavers) on the new basis rose from 1.2 million  in 1979  to 2.4 million  in 
1981,  and to 2.8 million  in 1982;  and this number  is officially  forecast  to 
rise to 3 million  in 1983.22  Thus  while inflation  has fallen  from  an average 
rate of 13.4  percent  in 1979  to a forecast average  of 4.6 percent  in 1983, 
unemployment  increased rapidly  to more than 12 percent of the labor 
force. The cumulative total of unemployment  in excess  of the rate 
prevailing  in 1979  now stands  at 20 point-years. 
The rise in the number  of long-term  unemployed,  shown in table 12, 
is particularly  startling.  From  a little more  than  3 million  unemployed  in 
October 1982 (using the new basis of measurement,  persons claiming 
benefits)  1 million  had  been unemployed  for more  than  a year. Although 
unemployment  increased  by 1  million  between  October  1980  and  October 
1982,  there  was no significant  increase  in the number  unemployed  for up 
22. The conventional  total unemployment  figure  understates  both  the level of and  the 
recent increase in unemployment.  Special employment  and training  schemes covered 
293,000 people in  1979 and 534,000 in 1982. The estimated effect on the registered 
unemployed  total rises from 180,000  in 1979  to 300,000  in 1982. See OECD  Economic 
Surveys: United Kingdom (OECD, February 1983), p. 58. Willem  H.  Buiter  and  Marcus  H.  Miller  337 
Table 12.  Unemployment Duration, October 1980 to October 1982 
Thousands of persons 
October 1982 
Duration of  Based  on 
unemployment  October  October  registra-  Based  on 
(n  =  number of weeks)  1980  1981  tion  claims 
n c  2  176.4  160.5  157.0  196.0 
2 <  n '  4  164.7  170.7  163.7  166.3 
4 <  n c  8  273.4  332.0  363.6  350.2 
8 <  n c  13  261.1  279.7  271.5  242.4 
13 <  n c  26  452.7  571.6  537.0  492.5 
26 <  n c  52  333.5  689.5  632.9  612.1 
n >  52  401.1  784.6  1,169.6  989.2 
Total unemployed  2,062.9  2,988.6  3,295.1  3,049.0 
Source: Employmenit Gazette,  vol.  91 (February  1983), table 2.8. 
to four weeks and only a slight  increase  in the number  unemployed  for 
less than six months. But the number  of unemployed  for more than a 
year rose by 588,000,  and  almost  a third  of this increase  was for persons 
less than  twenty-five  years  old.23  For  adult  males  this  increase  in  duration 
indicated a reduction in -flows  out of unemployment  rather than an 
increase  in flows into unemployment. 
The rise in unemployment  reflected  a national  decline  in employment 
that  was highly  concentrated  in the manufacturing  sector, which  in 1979 
accounted  for only about  30 percent  of total  employment.  Total  employ- 
ment  between 1979  and 1982  declined  by 6.1 percent  or a little  more  than 
1.5 million persons; but manufacturing  employment declined by 20 
percent  and  accounted  for almost  all of the drop  in total employment. 
Table  11  includes  a crude  estimate  of the  conventional  output  "gap' - 
the difference  between actual  output  (real  GDP, compromise  estimate) 
and trend potential as a percent of potential. The trend growth rate 
assumed  for this purpose  is 1.6 percent  a year, a simple  average  of the 
high  (2.5 percent)  and  low (0.75  percent)  GDP  growth  trends  considered 
by the government  for the first half of the 1980s in making  its long- 
term  spending  forecasts. Applying  this trend  to GDP in 1979  provides  a 
path  below which actual GDP fell by about  4 percentage  points in 1980 
and by an additional  4 points in 1981, but it remained  fairly constant 
23.  Department of Employment Gazette, vol. 91 (February 1983), p. 25. 338  Brookings Papers  on Economic  Activity, 2:1983 
at about 8 percent below trend in 1982 and 1983. This performance adds 
up to a cumulative output gap of 29 percentage point-years of potential 
GDP  by 1983.24 
THE  TRADE-OFF  BETWEEN  INFLATION  AND  UNEMPLOYMENT 
The newly constituted Treasury Committee of the House of Commons 
conducted a wide-ranging enquiry into monetary policy in 1980  and 1981. 
It received evidence from several sources on the inflation-unemployment 
trade-off. 
Among  the  witnesses  there  emerged  a clear difference  of  opinion 
between those who classified themselves  as monetarists and those who 
did not.  While the former were  sanguine, the latter were by and large 
pessimistic  about the  costs  of  curbing inflation by the monetary  and 
fiscal policies embodied in the MTFS plan. 
Nicholas  Kaldor, writing in July 1980, first warned 
As there  is no real  precedent  in Britain  for a Government  embarking  on a policy 
of deflation  with the explicit  object  of bringing  down  the rate  of pay settlements 
to a non-inflationary  level, it is impossible  to predict  the outcome.25 
but he went on to say, 
to generate  enough  unemployment  to cause a collapse in real wage resistance, 
the rise in unemployment  must become much faster than hitherto. .  .  . The 
Manpower  Services  Commission  recently  estimated  that  unemployment  will not 
reach the 2 million level until the end of 1981. For the strategy  to succeed it 
would  need to be more  like 3 million.26 
The National Institute of Economic and Social Research also forecast 
unemployment  rising to almost 2 million by the end of 1981 but without 
a substantial reduction in inflation-presumably  because "despite inten- 
sive econometric  investigation (of data on the United Kingdom) we have 
failed  to  discern  an effect  of  unemployment  on  wage  inflation when 
recent years are included."27 
24. This trend  is higher,  but only marginally  higher,  than the trend  of 1.3 percent  a 
year  observed  for peak-to-peak  GDP  from 1973  to 1979  (see figure  2). 
25.  Memorandum by  Lord  Kaldor,  in Memoranda  on Monetary  Policy,  House  of 
Commons  Treasury  and  Civil  Service  Committee,  sess. 1979-80  (HMSO,  1980),  p. 96. 
26. Ibid., p. 97. 
27. Memorandum  by the National Institute  of Economic and Social Research, in 
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James Tobin, in his testimony,  began by citing figures for the United 
States, where 
the evidence of the past is that  an extra  point  of unemployment  for a year  would 
reduce  the ongoing  domestic  rate  of wage and  price  inflation  by maybe  a third  of 
a point  or at most a half  of a point.28 
He continued, 
I have seen conflicting  estimates  of what the corresponding  coefficient  for that 
is in the United Kingdom.  Some are about the same as for the United States, 
others  saying  that  the response  is quicker  in the United  Kingdom  than  the United 
States. I do not know  about  that. One  ought  to say that  the theory  that  one might 
regard  as being  the underpinnings  of the present  policy here says that  when you 
have made this public threat about never giving in then the response will be 
quicker  than past estimates of it would suggest, because the unions, manage- 
ments, workers,  private  sector agents  all over the economy, will feel that they 
are  not  going  to be bailed  out by compensatory  or accommodative  monetary  and 
fiscal  policies in the future  and that  will make  them disinflate  faster. I must say 
that I am quite skeptical  about that, on the grounds  that  that kind  of a threat  is 
a threat  to everybody  in general  and  nobody  in particular.29 
In sharp contrast to these gloomy assessments,  witnesses  of a mone- 
tarist persuasion were uniformly optimistic. Milton Friedman's response 
to the relevant question was 
The best evidence is from  the prior  experience  of the U.K. and  other  countries. 
As I read that experience . . . I conclude that (a) only a modest reduction  in 
output  and  employment  will be a side effect of reducing  inflation  to single  figures 
by 1982  and (b) the effect on investment  and  the potential  for future  growth  will 
be highly  favourable.30 
In his written submission,  David Laidler noted, albeit cautiously, 
The experience  of 1975  onwards  does suggest  that  one might  expect a reduction 
of five percentage  points  in the inflation  rate  to be yielded,  as a first  round  effect, 
by a one percentage  point increase in unemployment,  but I would not stake 
much  on the quantitative  precision  of this, or any other  such estimate.3' 
Patrick Minford began his written evidence  by asserting, 
The overwhelming  problem  we face in the U.K. economy is that of breaking, 
once  and for all, the inflation psychology.  .  .  . The simulations of our model 
28. Monetary  Policy, Third  Report  from  the House of Commons  Treasury  and Civil 
Service  Committee,  vol. 2: Minutes  of Evidence,  sess. 1980-81  (HMSO,  1981),  p. 212. 
29. Ibid. 
30. Memorandum  by Professor  M. Friedman,  in Memoranda  on Monetary  Policy, 
p. 61. 
31. Memorandum  by Professor  D. E. W. Laidler,  in Memoranda  on Monetary  Policy, 
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suggest  that  on the assumption  that  policies are  properly  understood  when they 
are announced  and implemented,  the disturbance  to output and employment 
from  reduction  in the money supply  and  in the PSBR  would  be minimal.32 
THE  TREASURY  MODEL  AND  ECONOMETRIC  EVIDENCE 
How do the rise in unemployment  and the slump  in output  that have 
accompanied  the undoubted  success in bringing  down  inflation  compare 
with what might  have been expected on the basis of past evidence and 
international  experience? Is it consistent with whatever trade-off  be- 
tween  inflation  and  output  was perceived  by the authorities,  for  example? 
And  does recent econometric  evidence reveal anything  about  the trade- 
off? 
A central  role in the design of macroeconomic  policy in the United 
Kingdom  is played by the Treasury's  large macroeconometric  model, 
which is used to produce  short-term  forecasts and to predict  the effects 
of policy actions on the economy. Since 1975  when an act of Parliament 
so mandated,  the parameters  of this model  and  details  of its forecasts  (at 
budget time and in the autumn)  are made publicly available  and show 
that, when the MTFS was launched,  it included  an augmented  Phillips 
curve  as the  principal  determinant  of the  relation  between  unemployment 
and  inflation.  (The model has subsequently  been changed  ex post as we 
discuss below.) 
The model thus had an unemployment  rate associated with stable 
inflation  and generated  changes in steady-state  inflation  as unemploy- 
ment varied around  this "natural  rate." In such a model the impact  of 
these temporary  fluctuations  of unemployment  is determined  by the 
long-run  coefficient  on unemployment  in the Phillips  curve  itself and  the 
mean lags of the processes averaging  past prices in the Phillips  curve 
and averaging  past costs in the price-markup  equations.  The values for 
these key parameters  for two successive versions  of the Treasury  model 
are shown in the first  and second rows of table 13.33 
32. Memorandum  by Professor  A. P. Minford,  in Memoranda  on Monetary  Policy, 
pp. 131, 142. The model of which Minford  speaks is the Liverpool Macroeconomic 
Research  Group  model. For details see, for example, A. P. L. Minford,  "A Rational 
Expectations  Model of the U.K. under  Fixed and Floating  Exchange  Rates," in Karl 
Brunner  and  Allan  H. Meltzer,  eds., The  State of Macroeconomics,  Carnegie-Rochester 
Conference Series on  Public Policy,  vol.  12 (Amsterdam:  North-Holland, 1980), 
pp. 293-355. 
33. Because the Phillips  curve is nonlinear,  its slope depends  on the level of unem- 
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Table 13.  Unemployment Costs of Reducing Steady-State Inflation- 
the "Sacrifice Ratio" 
Determinants  of sacrifice  ratio 
Slope  of 
Sacrifice  Phillips  ML],  ML2, 
Model  ratioa  curveb  yearsc  yearsd 
Treasuty model 
1978  0.90U  2.50/U  1.50  0.75 
1979  0.34U  3.75/U  0.65  0.65 
1980  2.50  n.a.  n.a.  n.a. 
Recent  econometric 
evidence 
GJL,  1982  0.81e  2.18  1.09  0.67 
GJL,  1983  0.78  0.41  -0.01  0.33 
GLS,  1983  0.21 Ue  2.01/U  -0.01  0.45 
Sources:  Treasury  model,  1978 and  1979 versions-Marcus  H.  Miller,  "The  Unemployment  Costs  of Changing 
Steady  State  Inflation"  (University  of Warwick,  1979); 1980 version-Motnetary  Policy  Report,  Third Report from 
the House  of Commons Treasury and Civil Service  Committee,  sess.  1980-81 (HMSO,  1981); recent evidence,  GJL, 
1982-D.  Grubb, R. Jackman,  and R.  Layard,  "Causes  of the Current Stagflation,"  Review  of Economic  Stuidies, 
vol.  49,  no.  159 (1982),  pp.  707-30;  GJL,  1983-Dennis  Grubb,  Richard Jackman,  and  Richard  Layard,  "Wage 
Rigidity and Unemployment  in OECD Countries,"  Europeatn  Ecotnomnic  Review,  vol.  21 (March-April  1983), pp.  11- 
39; and GLS,  1983-D.  Grubb, R. Layard, and J. Symons,  "Wage,  Unemployment  and Income Policy,"  Discussion 
Paper 168 (London  School  of Economics,  Centre for Labour Economics,  July  1983). 
n.a.  Not  available. 
a.  Costs  shown  are the point-years  of unemployment  required to reduce  steady-state  inflation by one  percentage 
point; this ratio is similar to the concept  termed the sacrifice  ratio by Gordon and King. This ratio is calculated  as 
the  sum of the  mean lags  (third and fourth columns)  divided  by the  long-run Phillips curve  (second  column).  See 
Robert J. Gordon and Stephen  R. King,  "The Output Cost of Disinflation in Traditional and Vector  Autoregressive 
Models,"  BPEA,  1:1982, pp. 205-42.  The  U is the unemployment  rate measured in percentage  points. 
b.  Absolute  value of the long-run coefficient  on unemployment  in the Phillips curve for wage inflation. 
c.  Mean lag of the process  averaging price changes  in the Phillips curve. 
d.  Mean lag of the process  averaging wage changes  in determining price changes. 
e.  Authors' calculations  based  on coefficients  reported in sources  cited. 
The point-years of unemployment  required  to reduce steady-state 
inflation  by 1  percentage  point  (which  we refer  to as the "  sacrifice  ratio" 
by analogy with Gordon and King, who use the term to measure the 
output  cost of disinflation)  are shown  in the first  column  of the table  both 
for the Treasury  model and for recent Phillips  curve equations  fitted  to 
data on the United Kingdom  (and to data on OECD countries  besides 
the United Kingdom)  from 1957  to 1980.34 
The cost to unemployment  of reducing  inflation  shown  in the first  row 
of table 13  is obviously very high:  for unemployment  of about  6 percent 
the sacrifice ratio is 5.4, and this doubles if the unemployment  level 
doubles. Such calculations are clearly in direct contradiction  to the 
optimism  expressed by the monetarists,  who argued  that a determined 
34. Robert J. Gordon and Stephen R. King, "The Output  Cost of Disinflation  in 
Traditional  and  Vector  Autoregressive  Models,"  BPEA,  1:1982,  pp. 205-42. 342  Brookings Papers  on Economic  Activity,  2:1983 
monetary policy would reduce inflation  without much cost.35  In the 
second row, however, the sacrifice  ratio has been reduced by almost 
two-thirds  (partly  by an increase  in the assumed  effect of unemployment 
and  partly  by a shortening  of the lags)  and  stands  at 2.0 for  unemployment 
at 6 percent. Treasury  evidence submitted  to the House of Commons 
Committee  inquiry  on monetary  policy is consistent with this as shown 
in the third  row. 
It is important  to note that, although  many  parameters  of the  Treasury 
model are estimated econometrically from time-series data on the 
economy of the United Kingdom,  many  are imposed;  and this was true 
of the parameters  in the Phillips  curve itself, which is hardly  surprising 
given  the failure  of macroeconomic  modelers  to find  robust  econometric 
specifications  of the wage-price  behavior  in the United Kingdom  at the 
time. In the last three rows of table 13  we therefore  consider  briefly  the 
implications  of some recent  econometric  work  by the Centre  for Labour 
Economics, London School of Economics, on inflation  in OECD  coun- 
tries  based on annual  data  for 1957-80.  The parameters  estimated  imply 
sacrifice  ratios  for the United Kingdom  that are less than that incorpo- 
rated  in the Treasury  model of 1979  or 1980  (see the first  column). 
The studies shown in the last two rows in the table, in particular, 
suggest  that for the United Kingdom,  unlike  the United States, there is 
very little "nominal  inertia" in the wage-price  mechanism.36  The fact 
that  these same studies  also report  t-ratios  of below 2.0 for the estimated 
coefficients on unemployment  (or its log) must also warn one against 
taking  these low point  estimates  of the sacrifice  ratios  too seriously-for 
as the coefficient on unemployment  tends to move toward zero, the 
sacrifice  ratio  tends to approach  infinity! 
35. Thus the sacrifice  ratio implicit  in what Laidler  said by way of evidence is 0.20 
(one-fifth  percentage  point  of unemployment  for  one  year  to reduce  inflation  by 1  percentage 
point). The U.S. evidence at the time indicated  that, taking  an average  of econometric 
models, the sacrifice  ratio for its economy was 3.3. See Arthur  M. Okun, "Efficient 
Disinflationary Policies,"  American  Economic  Review,  vol.  68 (May  1978, Papers  and 
Proceedings,  1977), pp. 348-62. 
36. In other  words,  the sum  of the mean  lags  is small.  Note that  the tiny  negative  value 
shown  for  the  mean  lag  in  the  wage  equation  reflects  the  marginal  instability  of  the  estimated 
wage  equation,  so that  transitory  fluctuations  of unemployment  would  generate  explosive 
movements  of inflation  if it were  not  for  the one-quarter  lag  in  the  price  equation.  Estimates 
for other  countries,  including  West Germany  and  Japan,  imply  the same instability.  See 
Dennis  Grubb,  Richard  Jackman,  and  Richard  Layard,  "Wage  Rigidity  and  Unemployment 
in  OECD Countries," European Economic Review, vol.  21  (March-April 1983), 
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What has actually transpired since  1979 is summarized in table  11. 
The cumulated increase in unemployment point-years has been 20.2 and 
the rate of inflation has fallen by 8.8 percent, a ratio of 2.3. As a measure 
of  the  theoretical  sacrifice  ratio,  however,  this  is  doubtless  biased 
downward in two ways.37 First, it takes the reduction in actual  inflation 
rather than the reduction in "core"  or steady-state  inflation; second, 
and even more serious, it assumes that all the unemployment sacrifices 
are included, but a glance at the projections for unemployment made by 
the government in forecasting future government expenditures or social 
security benefits is enough to dispel any such notion.38 
How  can  one  reconcile  the  high observed  unemployment  rates- 
which prima facie imply sacrifice ratios above the 2.5 level built into the 
Treasury model of 1980-with  the empirical findings which imply a lower 
sacrifice ratio (basically because of low nominal inertia)? The answer is 
to treat a large part of the rise in unemployment in the past two or three 
years not as a cost of reducing inflation but as a rise in the natural rate. 
This seems to be the conclusion  that the study in the last row of table 
13 reaches,  as the authors of that study summarize in their findings: 
The  unemployment-inflation  trade-off  is still  alive and  well. If the wage  equation 
is estimated  with  log unemployment  as a regressor  it forecasts  recent  changes  in 
inflation  quite well. The  NAIRU [non-accelerating  inflation  rate of unemploy- 
ment]  has increased. This is partly  due to changes in productivity  growth  but 
partly  to shifts in the u/v [unemployment/vacancies]  curve. In Britain  this shift 
does not reflect  a worsening  mismatch  between  the supply  and  demand  of labour 
and  must  reflect  changes  in willingness  to work.39 
The authors affirm later that 
We see the fundamental  medium-term  problem  as being  that  the NAIRU  is high. 
And  in the medium  term  it is the NAIRU that  determines  the level of unemploy- 
ment.40 
In  the  next  section  therefore  we  consider  several  of  the  economic 
determinants  of  the  natural rate (NAIRU)  to  see  if they  support the 
37. As emphasized  by Jeffrey  Sachs  in his comments  on this paper. 
38.  See,  for  example,  The Government's  Expendituire Plans  1983-84  to  1985-86, 
presented  to Parliament  by the chancellor  of the exchequer,  Cmnd.  8789,  vol. 2 (HMSO, 
1983),  p. 65, in which unemployment  of more than 3 million  persons is estimated  up to 
1985-86. 
39. D. Grubb,  R. Layard,  andJ.  Symons,  "Wage,  Unemploymentand  Income  Policy," 
Discussion  Paper  168  (London  School of Economics,  Centre  for Labour  Economics,  July 
1983).  The  italics  are  added  for  emphasis  by the authors.  The notion  of willingness  to work 
used here  appears  to refer  to behavior  of unions  rather  than  to that  of individuals. 
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gloomy conclusion drawn  by these authors-that in the absence of an 
incomes policy, current  levels of unemployment  are a necessary con- 
comitant  of stable  inflation. 
Our discussion of the econometric evidence would be  seriously 
incomplete  without reference to the work inspired  by Dennis Sargan, 
who models wage determination  as "error-correction  behavior" by 
unions  that attempt  (by raising  money wages) to get real  wages back to 
some desired path. This leads to the inclusion of both the lagged real 
consumption  wage and  a time trend  in the wage equation  (discrepancies 
between which might explain rising unemployment  at low levels of 
inflation). 
In a paper  by Sargan  that  used quarterly  data  on the United  Kingdom 
to examine the interaction  among wages, earnings, and prices-with 
the warning  that "the estimated models have been found to verge on 
instability  so that changes in exogenous variables  may produce large 
fluctuations  in the price level"-  he notes that real wages and expected 
price  inflation  are substitutes  in the explanation  of wage  increases.41 The 
implication  of including  lagged real wages in the conventional  Phillips 
curve and omitting  the inflation  rate is that one has a Phillips  relation 
that  is not vertical  in the long run, as Sargan  points out.42  He also found 
that unemployment  has little effect on wages and used a variable  for 
strikes  instead  as a surrogate  measure  of worker-trade  union  militancy. 
On  reestimating  its econometric  model  in 1983,  the National  Institute 
of Economic and Social Research reports that it now finds significant 
unemployment  effects on the rate of wage inflation  in an equation  that 
includes  the lagged  consumption  wage, a time trend,  and  a coefficient  of 
less than  unity on a moving  average  of inflation.43 
If the time trend  were to be substantially  in excess of the path  for real 
consumption  wage, such an equation  would  in principle  account  for the 
rise in unemployment  (as the consequence of real wage pressure by 
unions whose trend  targets  for real wages exceed what is feasible). But 
the trend of 2.3 percent a year included in their equation  is not much 
higher than the  1.7 percent annual rise in real earnings per capita 
41. J. D. Sargan,  "A Model of Wage-Price  Inflation,"  Review  of Economic  Studies, 
vol. 47 (January  1980),  p. 102. 
42. Ibid., p. 108.  Hence one cannot  talk of NAIRU (a unique  stable inflation  level of 
unemployment)  but  only the low inflation  rate  of unemployment. 
43. See Simon Brooks and Brian Henry, "Reestimation  of the National Institute 
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(according  to the institute's  definitions  of this variable)  over the 1979  to 
1982  period;44  so that the phenomenon  does not appear  to explain the 
rise in unemployment  over the period.45 
In a forthcoming  paper  by S. Wren-Lewis,  Sargan's  error-correction 
interpretation  of the determination  of wage-earnings  increases  is adopted.i6 
Grubb  reports: "This and similar  equations  estimated  by Wren-Lewis 
are the basis of the current  wage equation in the Treasury  economic 
forecasting model for the U.K.  economy."47  But in Wren-Lewis's 
formulation,  as in the current  Treasury  model, it is no longer  unemploy- 
ment  but output  that appears  in the wage equation.  For the Treasury  it 
appears  that the recent rise in unemployment  is not to be interpreted  as 
a rise in the natural  rate, which must  be tolerated  to check inflation:  the 
course  of unemployment  per  se is not  relevant  to the  behavior  of inflation! 
In  the next section  we consider  the various  conventional  determinants 
of the natural  rate  to see how they have changed  over the recent  past. 
THE  NATURAL  RATE  OF  UNEMPLOYMENT48 
If there  has been a large  increase  in the natural  rate  of unemployment 
since 1979,  and if this increase in the natural  rate is independent  of the 
increase  in actual  unemployment,  estimates  of the cost to unemployment 
and  output  of reducing  inflation  will have to be revised  downward. 
The natural  rate  of unemployment  is often  identified  with equilibrium 
frictional  unemployment  reflecting  search, geographic  or occupational 
mismatch  between unemployment  and  unfilled  vacancies, demographic 
factors, and so on. According  to this definition  it is almost  impossible  to 
make  the case that  much  of the increase  in actual  unemployment  reflects 
an  increase  in the natural  rate.  As pointed  out  by Metcalf  and  Richardson, 
changes  in the age and sex composition  of the population  have affected 
the natural  rate favorably  in the past ten years, and  the geographic  and 
44. Ibid., p. 67. 
45. Specifically,  the real  earnings  gap  of about  2.5 percent  for  this period  implies  a rise 
of about 1.5 points in the low-inflation  unemployment  rate in the institute's  model. We 
discuss  the "real  producer-wage  gap" theory  of Sachs  below. 
46. S. Wren-Lewis,  "A Model  of the Behaviour  of Private  Sector  Earnings  from 1966 
to 1980," Oxford Economic Papers (forthcoming). 
47. David Grubb, "Lagged Output  in the Wage Equation," Discussion Paper 161 
(London  School  of Economics,  Centre  for Labour  Economics,  June 1983). 
48. Interpreted  to include  the unemployment  rate  associated  with  low inflation  if there 
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occupational  mismatch  between vacant  jobs and unemployed  workers 
does not appear  to have increased.49 
Most discussions of the natural  rate  for the United Kingdom  include 
what may be termed union power-induced  classical unemployment  in 
the natural  rate. The argument  is as follows. If higher  unemployment 
does not have an appreciable  depressing  effect on the rate of change  of 
the real  consumption  wage in the unionized  sector, and  if inflation  either 
has no effect on the real consumption  wage (or only a temporary  effect, 
to the extent that it is unanticipated,  with full catching  up in the longer 
run), an increase in union power will, by raising  the union real wage, 
reduce the demand for labor and cause a loss of employment in the 
unionized  sector. This presupposes  that the effective demand  function 
for labor in the unionized sector can be represented  by a downward- 
sloping schedule for the marginal  revenue product  of labor. Whether 
such an increase in union power and in the union-nonunion  markup 
raises the economy-wide  unemployment  rate  depends  on what  happens 
in the nonunionized  sectors of the economy. Those who lose jobs in the 
unionized sector as a result of the increase in the union markup  either 
become unemployed  or take ajob in the nonunionized  sectors in which 
the real wage, which is competitively  determined,  will fall. The choice 
between unemployment  and employment  in the nonunion  sectors de- 
pends on the relation between unemployment  compensation  and the 
nonunion  wage. To the extent that  unions  feel a concern  for those among 
their  members  who become unemployed,  an increase  in unemployment 
benefits  may weaken restraint  and lead to an increase in the union real 
wage. 
One can obtain  a sense of the likely significance  of the argument  that 
much, if not all, of the decline in employment  is classical  by considering 
the behavior  of indexes of trade  union  power, changes  in  unit-labor  costs 
or in the wage gap, and changes in the "replacement  ratio"-the  ratio 
of income when unemployed  to income when employed. 
Trade  Union  Power. Table 14 shows some measures  of trade  union 
power and activity since 1970. "Trade  union density" is measured  by 
dividing  union  membership  by the number  of persons  employed  plus  the 
number  unemployed,  excluding  school leavers. By including  the unem- 
ployed  in  the denominator,  this  may  overstate  union  power  in  an  upswing 
49. David  Metcalf  and  Ray Richardson,  "Labour,"  in A. R. Prest  and  D. J. Coppock, 
eds.,  U.K. Economy: A Manual of Applied Economics,  9th ed. (London: Weidenfeld and 
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Table 14.  Trade Union Membership and Industrial Disputes, 1970-82 
Corrected  Industrial disputes 
Union  union  Number 
density  density  of stop-  Working 
Yeat  (percent)a  (percent)b  pages  days lost 
1970  48.5  49.8  3,906  10,980 
1971  48.6  50.3  2,228  13,551 
1972  49.4  51.3  2,497  23,909 
1973  49.2  50.5  2,873  7,197 
1974  50.3  51.6  2,922  14,750 
1975  51.6  53.7  2,282  6,012 
1976  52.1  55.0  2,016  3,284 
1977  53.7  56.8  2,703  10,142 
1978  54.4  57.6  2,471  9,405 
1979  55.3  58.2  2,080  29,474 
1980  53.1  56.7  1,330  11,964 
1981  50.6  56.2  1,338  4,266 
1982  n.a.  n.a.  1,454  5,256 
Sources:  Union  membership  and industrial disputes  are from Employment  Gazette,  vol.  89 (January  1981), pp. 
26-28,  and vol.  91 (June  1983), table 4.2,  and previous  issues;  employment  and Linemployment are from Economic 
Trends, no.  358 (August  1983), p. 36, and previous  issues. 
n.a.  Not  available. 
a.  Union  membership divided  by employees  in employment  and unemployment,  excluding  school  leavers. 
b.  Trade union membership divided  by number of persons  employed. 
and  understate  it in a downswing,  as the unemployed  typically  cease to 
be counted  as union  members.  "Corrected  trade  union  density" divides 
membership  by persons  employed  only. It is not clear  which measure  is 
superior;  some believe that  unemployment  weakens unions.50 
The trade  union  density figures  show a sizable  rise between 1973  and 
1979 (6.1 percentage  points by the uncorrected  measure and 7.7 per- 
centage points by the corrected one). The uncorrected  measure then 
declines rapidly toward its level in the early 1970s as unemployment 
dramatically  increases, and the corrected measure also shows a drop 
of 2 percentage points from 1979 to  1981. To help interpret these 
aggregate  figures,  it should  be noted  that  about  50  percent  of the increase 
in union membership  between 1969 and 1979 occurred in the public 
sector, especially in health services, local government,  and education. 
Another  20 percent occurred  in engineering  and metals. Between 1968 
50. Both  measures  suffer  from  potentially  serious  endogeneity  bias  as indexes  of union 
power  because  powerful  unions  are  likely  to attract  many  members.  The  same  endogeneity 
problems  limit  the usefulness  of the union-nonunion  markup  as an index  of union  power; 
the markup  is the outcome  of a process  in which  union  power  is but  one of the exogenous 
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and 1979  union  density in manufacturing  increased  from  49.9 percent  to 
69.8  percent,  both  manual  workers  (up  from  62.0  percent  to 80.3  percent) 
and white-collar  workers  (up from 15.4 percent  to 43.7 percent).  Other 
sectors such as construction  and private services saw a much smaller 
increase  from  a much  smaller  base. 
Both measures  point to an increase  in union  power until 1979.  Since 
then the fortunes of organized  labor have waned very sharply.  Only if 
union power affects employment with a long lag can one reasonably 
attribute  part  of the post-1979  increase  in unemployment  to the pre-1979 
increase in union power. Empirical work by Nickell and Andrews 
estimates  that  union  power  reduced  employment  by 400,000  since World 
War II by raising  real wages. While by no means insignificant,  this is 
modest alongside  the loss of 2 million  jobs between 1979  and 1982.51 
Dennis Sargan, in the study referred  to above, measures "worker- 
trade union" militancy by a moving average of working  days lost in 
strikes in the previous three years. In table 14 that measure shows a 
pronounced  peak in 1979, followed by a return  to more normal  levels 
thereafter.  The number  of strikes,  also shown  in the table, declined  from 
1977  to 1980  to the lowest level since 1942, and has risen only a little 
since then. This evidence suggests a decline in union  militancy  from  its 
recent  peak, though  whether  this is merely  cyclical remains  to be seen. 
Labor  Costs. Evidence of an increase  in real  marginal  labor  costs in 
excess of the increase  in labor's  marginal  revenue  product  at a constant 
flow of person-hour input would support the view that part of the 
employment  decline simply  reflects  labor  pricing  itself  out of the market. 
Jeffrey  Sachs has argued  that such a development,  reflected  in what he 
calls the wage gap, is central  in explaining  the evolution  of both inflation 
and unemployment.52  The wage gap is measured as the ratio of the 
normalized  labor  share  in value  added  relative  to the average  normalized 
share  in 1965-69, where the normalization  is used to correct  for cyclical 
effects on observed shares. 
The wage-gap data for manufacturing  in the United Kingdom  are 
shown in table 15, calculated  on the same basis as Sachs proposes. The 
51. S. J. Nickell  and  M. Andrews,  "Unions,  Real  Wages,  and  Employment  in Britain, 
1951-79," Discussion Paper 152 (London School of Economics, Centre for Labour 
Economics,  April  1983). 
52. Jeffrey D. Sachs, "Real Wages and Unemployment  in the OECD Countries," 
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Table 15.  Labor Share and Normalized Labor Share of GDP, 1973-82 
Total economy 
Normal- 
ized  Entire economy, 
labor  excluding oil and gas  Manufacturing  sector 
Uncor-  share,  Uncor-  Normal-  Uncor-  Normal- 
rected  exclud-  rected  ized  rected  ized 
labor  ing self-  labor  labor  labor  labor 
Year  sharea  employedb  sharea  shareb  sharea  shareb 
1973  66.9  66.9  66.9  66.9  71.9  71.9 
1974  70.2  68.2  70.2  68.6  78.6  76.8 
1975  72.6  68.8  72.6  69.6  81.1  76.5 
1976  70.8  68.2  71.2  69.4  79.7  78.6 
1977  67.2  65.8  68.3  67.3  73.6  73.1 
1978  66.7  66.4  70.0  70.0  72.8  72.4 
1979  67.8  67.8  70.1  70.1  77.4  77.4 
1980  69.1  67.3  72.3  70.7  79.2  75.3 
1981  69.2  67.6  73.2  71.8  81.3  79.2 
1982  68.1  67.9  n.a.  n.a.  n.a.  n.a. 
Sources:  Uncorrected  labor share, employment,  and GDP are from Economlic Trends, no.  358 (August  1983), pp. 
6,  14, 36,  and previous  issues;  entire  economy,  excluding  oil  and gas,  is from Natiotial  Income  atid Expetidituires 
(HMSO,  1983), table 31; and normalized  shares are based on authors' calculations. 
n.a.  Not  available. 
a.  Ratio  of  employment  income  to  GDP  (income  based),  with  employment  income  defined  as  wages,  salaries, 
military pay, and employers'  contributions. 
b.  Uncorrected share multiplied by the ratio of measured productivity to trend productivity, where trend productivity 
is measured by the method suggested  in Jeffrey D. Sachs,  "Real Wages and Unemployment  in the OECD Countries," 
BPEA,  1:1983, pp. 255-89. 
normalized  labor share  for manufacturing  rises by almost  7 points  from 
1978  to 1981;  the rise, while substantial,  is much less than the increase 
of 11 points reported  by Sachs. This illustrates  the great sensitivity of 
these calculations  to the addition  of one year's  data.  Adding  productivity 
data  for 1982  raises the assumed  post-1979  trend  from  0.8 percent  to 1.2 
percent  a year, using  annual  data,  where  this "trend"  is measured  as the 
average  of the actual productivity  growth  from 1973  to 1979  and actual 
growth  after 1979. 
The normalized  labor  share  for the entire  economy calculated  on the 
same basis, however (second column of the table), shows hardly  any 
change  from 1973, and no change since 1979.  This constancy of share, 
in surprising  contrast  to the figures  for manufacturing,  masks a shift in 
nonlabor  income to nonoil and nongas rents. When the oil and gas are 
excluded, as in the fourth  column,  a distinct  rise in the normalized  labor 350  Brookings Papers  on Economic  Activity,  2:1983 
share  is observable,  though  it is much  less marked  than  for manufactur- 
ing. 
The substantial  increase  in labor's  share  in the manufacturing  sector, 
whether  normalized  or not, is consistent with the view that real labor 
cost-push  in the manufacturing  sector has contributed  to the decline of 
employment. It is also consistent with the view that real wages rose 
endogenously  through  a combination  of nominal  wage inertia  and con- 
tractionary  demand  shocks. Between 1975  and 1981  nominal  wages and 
salaries  per unit of output  and nominal  unit-labor  costs rose 10 percent 
more in manufacturing  than in the economy as a whole.53  While the 
output  prices  of certain  internationally  exposed sectors  of manufacturing 
(such as steel, metal manufacturing,  electrical engineering,  chemicals 
and allied industries,  and instrument  engineering)  have risen much  less 
than  the overall  GDP deflator  since the pound  sterling  began  its upward 
climb, this is not true  for manufacturing  as a whole.54 
For the entire  economy it appears  that  labor  has managed  to resist  the 
impact  of rising  oil and  gas rents  on its share,  with  the result  that  this has 
been taken out of profits  and rents elsewhere in the economy. The fact 
that  real  product  wage  pressure  has  been stronger  in  the United  Kingdom, 
an oil-producing  country, than elsewhere is probably  because unions 
have not realized  the necessity, despite rising  oil revenues, of reducing 
unit-labor  costs in line with overseas competitors.  The government  has 
not helped in this. It first  encouraged  widespread  indexation  in 1973-74 
and then adopted a narrow  cashflow rather  than a permanent  income 
view when planning  tax cuts after  the second rise in oil prices. 
Unemployment Benefits.  On the labor supply side, higher unemploy- 
ment benefits could increase the natural rate of unemployment  by 
encouraging  longer search, and thus lengthening  the duration  of unem- 
ployment or simply by making it possible for workers to leave the 
effective labor force and choose a life on the dole and perhaps  in the 
"black economy." Although  registered  as unemployed,  these persons 
no longer  search  for employment.  This voluntary  unemployment  choice 
presumably  depends  on the replacement  ratio,  which  is the ratio  of after- 
tax income when employed to income after tax and work-related  ex- 
penses when  employed.  This  replacement  ratio  varies  widelyfordifferent 
income levels and family types, and is summarized  by the average  for 
53.  Economic  Trends, no. 358 (August 1983), p. 40. 
54.  United Kingdom,  Central Statistical Office, Monthly Digest  of Statistics,  no. 451 
(July  1983),  p. 153,  table 18-1. Willem H.  Buiter and Marcus H.  Miller  351 
different  family types displayed  below.55  There is no evidence of a rise 
in the replacement  ratio  that  could account  for higher  unemployment  as 
a supply-side  phenomenon. 
Replacement  ratio 
(average) 
1960-64  0.44 
1965-69  0.52 
1970-74  0.50 
1975-79  0.49 
1980-82  0.48 
SUMMARY 
The evidence suggests that, if the economy were stimulated to 
eliminate  Keynesian deficient effective demand  unemployment,  there 
would  remain  a margin,  possibly substantial,  of classical  unemployment 
over and  above the frictional  natural  rate.  Real  labor  costs, especially in 
manufacturing,  are above their equilibrium  levels  seen in 1979, for 
example. 
The evidence also suggests that an inflationary  spiral can quickly 
erupt  when a conflict  exists between the real  incomes  available  and  that 
for which groups are bargaining.  But it does not support  the view that 
the solution  to this process is to leave unemployment  at its present  level 
or let it climb  higher. 
For one thing, several studies  have found  that  the level of unemploy- 
ment  itself  was not  a significant  explanatory  variable  in  the  wage-earnings 
equation.56  For another, a policy of reducing national income and 
employment  (and  it is important  to note  that  the number  ofjobs in Britain 
fell absolutely  and  continuously  from 1979  to early 1983)  seems unlikely 
to solve conflicts whose basis is claims for real income.57  Indeed, the 
massive rise in unemployment  since 1979  and the costs of this to the 
exchequer  have, given the desire to reduce the deficit, led to increases 
in the burden of personal taxation that may have exacerbated the 
inflationary  spiral  by holding  down real  after-tax  income. 
55. Based  on David  Metcalf,  Stephen  Nickell, and Nicos Floros, "Still Searching  for 
an Explanation  of Unemployment  in Inter-War  Britain,"  Discussion Paper  71 (London 
School  of Economics,  Centre  for Labour  Economics,  September  1980). 
56. See Sargan,  "A Model  of Wage-Price  Inflation";  Wren-Lewis,  "A Model  of the 
Behaviour  of Private Sector Earnings";  and "H.M. Treasury  Macroeconomic  Model, 
1982"  (London:  H. M. Treasury,  1982). 
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While supporting  the search for a viable incomes policy that would 
reduce the natural  rate, we are convinced that there is ample  room for 
noninflationary  expansion even in its absence. The limits to which 
demand  management  may operate  without  rekindling  inflation  are, to be 
sure, dependent  on the institutional  structure  of labor  markets  and the 
behavior  of trade  unions in particular.58  But since 1980  the trade  unions 
have become weaker  than at any time during  the previous  decade. And 
the government  can avoid actions  that  helped  to stimulate  inflation  in its 
first period of office, such as the 8 percent rise in indirect  taxation in 
June 1979  and  the 25 percent  increase  in public  sector salaries  from 1979 
to 1980. 
A Productivity Phoenix? 
Improved  productivity  is one of the main benefits claimed for the 
policies adopted by the Thatcher government. Supply-side policies, 
according  to this  view, have  created  conditions  that  permit  and  encourage 
improvements  in the efficiency with which existing labor and capital 
resources are utilized. These policies include  legislation  restricting  the 
power of organized  labor, some privatization  of publicly  owned indus- 
tries, and a reduction  in marginal  and average  direct  tax rates  for those 
at the upper end of the income distribution. Some observers also 
emphasize a growing awareness, especially in the publicly owned 
industries, that this government  is unwilling  to bail out or subsidize 
chronic  loss-makers  on the same  scale as its predecessors.  The  recession 
itself is viewed in rather  Darwinian  terms as speeding  up the transition 
to a higher norm of efficiency through the liquidation  of weak and 
inefficient  firms.  The resources  thus  freed  will in due  course  be absorbed 
into  the new high  productivity  uses-a  phoenix  will arise  from  the ashes. 
The record of labor productivity  is shown in table 16 for the total 
economy and for the manufacturing  sector. The reason for isolating 
manufacturing  is that the best data on productivity  are for this sector, 
58.  As Keynes  himself recognized  in The General  Theory of Employment, Interest, 
and Money (Harcourt,  Brace, 1936),  chap. 2, p. 8. Robert  Skidelsky, who is currently 
writing  a biography  of Keynes at the University  of Warwick,  has suggested  that,  of the 16 
percent  unemployment  observed  during  the  depression,  Keynes  would  have  treated  almost 
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Table 16.  Output, Employment, and Labor Productivity, 1970 to 1983:1 
Manufacturing  sector 
Growth 
in output  Entire 
Growth  per person  economy, 
Employ-  Growth in  in output  hour  growth in 
Year  Output  ment  output per  per person  utilization  output per 
or  (index,  (index,  person  hour  corrected  person 
Quarter  1975 = 100)  1975 = 100)  (percent)a  (percent)a  (percent)ab  (percent)c 
1970  98.4  111.3  0.6  n.a.  n.a.  2.2 
1971  97.3  107.5  2.3  4.1  n.a.  3.1 
1972  99.6  103.8  6.0  6.3  n.a.  2.9 
1973  108.8  104.3  8.6  7.1  2.7  3.5 
1974  107.5  104.6  -  1.4  0.6  2.2  -  1.9 
1975  100.0  100.0  -  2.7  -1.9  1.5  -  1.4 
1976  102.0  96.9  5.3  5.2  3.1  2.1 
1977  103.9  97.2  1.6  0.9  -1.3  1.6 
1978  104.5  96.8  0.8  1.0  1.1  1.7 
1979  104.6  95.8  1.4  1.4  2.1  0.2 
1980  95.0  90.3  -3.8  -  1.3  2.9  -2.0 
1981  89.0  81.6  3.7  4.9  7.8  1.0 
1982  88.4  77.1  5.1  3.9  1.4  3.3 
1980:1  100.8  93.7  -  8.8  -  6.4  -5.3  -  2.2 
2  97.6  91.9  -  4.8  0.0  10.6  -  4.0 
3  93.3  89.3  -  6.3  -  0.4  10.6  -  2.9 
4  88.7  86.4  -7.1  -  1.1  9.2  -  1.1 
1981:1  87.9  84.1  7.6  9.3  16.2  3.0 
2  88.3  82.1  12.4  7.9  -  1.3  3.0 
3  89.8  80.6  14.9  10.4  3.0  5.3 
4  89.8  79.6  5.1  3.5  1.8  3.3 
1982:1  89.5  78.6  4.0  3.2  3.9  0.4 
2  89.0  77.7  2.1  2.8  -  1.0  2.9 
3  88.1  76.5  2.5  1.7  -  2.8  4.0 
4  87.0  75.4  0.3  -  0.7  5.5  3.2 
1983:1  88.5  73.6  18.1  18.2  n.a.  2.1 
Source: Econiomic Trenids, no.  358 (August  1983), pp. 28, 34, and previous issues.  The utilization corrected  series 
is from Lionel  Mendis and John Muellbauer,  "Has There Been a British Productivity  Breakthrough'?  Evidence  fronm 
an Aggregate Production Function for Manufacturing" (London School of Economics.  Centre for Labour Economics, 
July 1983). 
a.  Quarterly changes  are at annual rates. 
b.  See  text for a description  of this series. 
c.  Annual data for  1973-82  excludes  oil and natural gas production. 
and  most empirical  research  on the subject  covering  the recent  past  deals 
with manufacturing  productivity.59  However, the importance  of this 
sector should not be exaggerated,  as it appears  to be in secular  decline 
59. For example, see  S.  G. B.  Henry and Simon Wren-Lewis, "Manufacturing 
Employment  and  Expected  Output,"  Discussion  Paper  55  (National  Institute  of Economic 354  Brookings Papers  on Economic  Activity,  2:1983 
and now accounts for less than a third of economic activity in the United 
Kingdom.60 
It is clear that there was a sizable rise in labor productivity in the last 
two years, with the improvement more marked in manufacturing than in 
the  economy  as  a  whole.  In  what  follows  we  first  describe  these 
encouraging developments in more detail, while noting that the improve- 
ments  thus  far observed  are  by  no  means  unprecedented  in  recent 
experience  in the United Kingdom. We then examine how much of this 
productivity recovery  may simply be in the nature of one-time adjust- 
ments rather than a change in the trend growth of productivity. Finally, 
we  look  at recent  developments  and trends  observed  in the  United 
Kingdom since 1973 and trends before the oil shocks of the 1970s. 
THE  PRODUCTIVITY  BOOM  SINCE  I98O 
Since its trough in 1980 output per worker in manufacturing has grown 
by 10 percent from 1980:4 to 1981:4 and by 2.2 percent from 1981:4 to 
1982:4. A further rise of 4.2 percent occurred in the single quarter of 
1983:1. These and parallel data for other measures of productivity in the 
United Kingdom's economy  are summarized in the display below. 
Productivity  growth  (percent) 
1980:4-  1981:4-  1983:1 
1981:4  1982:4  (atannual 
Productivity measure  rate) 
Manufacturing 
Output  per worker  10.0  2.2  17.9 
Output  per hour  7.8  1.7  18.3 
Entire  economy 
Output  per worker  3.7  2.6  2.0 
Output  per worker,  excluding 
North  Sea oil and  gas  3.5  2.1  2.4 
Research, 1983);  P. S. O'Brien, "Employment:  Systematic  Econometric  Comparisons" 
(National  Institute  of Economic  and Social Research,  March  1983);  and Lionel Mendis 
and  John  Muellbauer,  "Has There  Been a British  Productivity  Breakthrough?  Evidence 
from  an Aggregate  Production  Function  for Manufacturing"  (London  School  of Econom- 
ics, Centre  for Labour  Economics,  July 1983). 
60. The manufacturing  share of total employment  was 28.5 percent in 1981, 31.3 
percent  in 1979,  and 36.4 percent  in 1971.  Its share  in value added  was 23.7 percent  in 
1981,  27.0 percent  in 1979,  and  31.7 percent  in 1971. 
61. We are also warned  by the Central  Statistical  Office  that since the second half  of Willem H.  Buiter and Marcus H.  Miller  355 
The kind  of productivity  spurt  seen in the past two and  a half years is 
not without precedent in the recent economic history of the United 
Kingdom. Manufacturing  output per worker grew by  15.2 percent 
between 1966:4  and 1969:  1, compared  with 16.2  percent  between 1980:4 
and 1983:1.  Manufacturing  output  per  hour  grew  by 16.6  percent  between 
1971:1  and 1973:2, compared with 13.3 percent between 1980:4  and 
1983:  1, as shown  in table 16. Between the two cyclical peaks  of 1966  and 
1973,  output  per worker  in manufacturing  grew at an annual  rate of 4.4 
percent  and  at 3.2 percent  for the entire  economy. 
The series for output per hour is generally thought to be a better 
approximation  of the nonobservable  trend  productivity  than  output  per 
worker because it contains a partial correction for changes in labor 
utilization  rates. Mendis and Muellbauer  note that reported  changes in 
hours worked, while providing  a reasonable  estimate of change in the 
amount  of overtime, were likely to understate  or even leave unreported 
the changes in the amount of "undertime"-hours paid for but not 
worked.62  Reported  variations  in hours therefore  represented  samples 
drawn from a truncated  distribution.  Correction  for this yields their 
"utilization-corrected"  series for labor productivity  in manufacturing 
shown in table 16. This series had its trough  in 1980:1,  three quarters 
before  the other  two series. Rapid  growth  in the index  lasted  from 1980:1 
until 1981:1  when utilization-corrected  productivity  was 11.3 percent 
above its level five quarters  earlier.  During  the six quarters  from 1981:2 
to  1982:4, utilization-corrected  productivity only gained another 2.6 
percent.  The data  do not extend into 1983,  so one cannot  verify  whether 
the large productivity  gain in the other two series is mirrored  in the 
Mendis-Muellbauer  index. The Mendis-Muellbauer  utilization  measure 
has gained support no doubt from its remarkable  similarity to the 
independently  constructed  "technological  productivity  index" of Ben- 
nett and Smith-Gavine. This index also dates the productivity leap 
between 1980:1  and 1981:1  and  shows the same  relative  stagnation  since. 
1981  the provisional  estimates  of the employed  labor  force may have been understating 
the level of employment,  particularly  in the service  industries.  This  implies  that  output  per 
person  employed  for the entire  economy  may  have been slightly  overstated. 
62. Mendis  and Muellbauer,  "Has There Been a Productivity  Breakthrough?"  See 
A. J. Bennett  and  S. A. N. Smith-Gavine,  "The  Index  of Percentage  Utilization  of Labour: 
Bulletin  to Co-operating  Firms,"  no. 44, February  1983,  cited  in Mendis  and  Muellbauer. 
The index  is based  on a survey  of manufacturing  firms  and  measures  the rate  of utilization 
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EMPLOYMENT  AND  OUTPUT  EXPECTATIONS 
Even if the growth  of productivity  since late 1980  is not  without  recent 
precedent, it still appears unusual given the behavior of output and 
employment. In particular,  it is striking  that these productivity  gains 
have been achieved  when manufacturing  output  was falling  sharply  and 
the entire  economy was settling  into a growth  recession. 
Labor  productivity  usually  recovers  when the economy recovers, as 
the counterpart  of Okun's law. For cost-minimizing  firms that take 
output  as parametric,  employment  adjustment  will  make  optimal  current 
employment  a function of past employment  and of current  and antici- 
pated future  output and future  input  prices. Expansions  (contractions) 
in output that are perceived as temporary,  such as the fluctuations  of 
economic  activity  in a regular  business  cycle, will, if employment  is more 
costly to adjust  than hours and intensity  of work, give rise to increases 
(reductions)  in labor utilization  rates and thus in output  per worker. If 
capital utilization  rates vary procyclically, this will reinforce  the ten- 
dency for the covariation  of output  and employment  over the cycle to 
bear little if any relation to the marginal  product of effective labor 
services, holding  constant  all other  inputs  and  the state of technology. 
Mechanical application of Okun's law would hardly lead one to 
expect a recovery  in productivity  when there  is no basic recovery  in the 
economy, and the usual time-series  regressions, which relate employ- 
ment  to lagged  output  and  employment,  greatly  underpredict  productiv- 
ity since 1980:4.63  If the recovery of productivity  from its trough  is not 
to be accounted  for by the recovery of the economy, could it not then 
represent the beginning  of a new trend, evidence of a "productivity 
phoenix"? 
Such an argument  is, we believe, not well founded as it takes little 
account of the way in which changed expectations will alter Okun's 
law itself. The same anticipatory  behavior  that generates the cyclical 
recovery of productivity  in an upswing can generate an even quicker 
recovery  of productivity  when  output  is expected  to stabilize  at  recession 
level. 
By late 1980  manufacturers  realized  that  this  was  no  ordinary  recession 
63. See Henry  and  Wren-Lewis,  "Manufacturing  Employment";  O'Brien,  "Employ- 
ment";  and  Mendis  and  Muellbauer,  "Has There  Been a Productivity  Breakthrough?" Willem H. Buiter and Marcus H.  Miller  357 
to be followed by a traditional  recovery and return  to previous high 
levels of capacity  utilization.  Industrial  confidence  indicators,  industrial 
production  indicators, and export order books recovered somewhat 
toward  the end of 1980  but did not signal any kind of strong  recovery. 
The government's own output projections, like those made by most 
domestic nongovernmental  forecasters and by the OECD, signaled 
stagnation  followed by low rates  of growth.  Because there  was no point 
in hoarding  labor  any longer  in anticipation  of a strong  recovery, labor 
was promptly shed faster than output fell, with a resulting  boost for 
productivity. 
By this  interpretation  one would  need  to correct  the observed  increase 
in labor  productivity  for changed  output  expectations  before  estimating 
gains in underlying  efficiency. The Mendis-Muellbauer  utilization-cor- 
rected productivity  series is one attempt  to do this, and we believe it 
presents  a better  measure  of the productivity  shift  that  has occurred. 
As has been noted, however, Mendis and Muellbauer  find a rapid 
increase  in corrected  productivity  starting  in early 1980.  Before  conclud- 
ing that this path accurately represents  the new trend, however, one 
must account for the one-time gains that may have occurred  following 
the contraction  of capacity. 
THE  EFFECT  OF  SCRAPPING  AND  CLOSURES 
In the economy as a whole-and  especially in manufacturing,  where 
output  fell by one-sixth between 1979  and the end of 1982-there has 
been widespread scrapping of plant and machinery and closure of 
production  units and firms,  the rational  response if a return  to previous 
levels of capacity utilization  is likely to be postponed substantially  or 
indefinitely.  Assuming  that,  on balance,  productive  capacity  gets scrapped 
and labor  laid off in inverse order  to its efficiency, the average  level of 
productivity of  the surviving capacity will be raised. None  of the 
resources  that  continue  to be employed,  however, need to be used more 
productively than before for this statistical improvement  to occur.54 
Even if production  units are shut down temporarily  instead of being 
scrapped  permanently,  the same productivity  increase  will be recorded 
in the short run. Whether  there is a real improvement  depends on the 
64. The simplest  model  generating  this  kind  of behavior  has  fixed  coefficients  between 
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use made of the resources that have been freed by shutting  down the 
least efficient  capacity. 
Thus far most of these resources have become unemployed and 
remain so-a  transfer  from a low to a zero productivity  use. To the 
extent that  these resources  are  in due course  reemployed  at productivity 
levels as high  as those of the surviving  capacity,  the higher  productivity 
levels recorded  with  the surviving  capacity  can  be viewed as permanent. 
It is difficult  to think  of good economic reasons  for believing  labor  that 
previously worked in low-productivity  units will be reabsorbed  at a 
higher  level of productivity  without increased  expenditures  on capital 
formation.  Even if this  were  to occur,  the question  would  remain  whether 
a prolonged  period of enforced idleness is necessary before factors in 
low-productivity  uses can be transferred  to high-productivity  uses. 
In short,  the current  productivity  record  of much  of the manufacturing 
industry  in the United  Kingdom  is like the cricket  team  that  improves  its 
batting  average  by only playing  its better  batsmen!  As long as the "tail- 
enders" score some runs, however, it would surely  be better  to let them 
play even if it does  lower the side's batting average. Mendis and 
Muellbauer  concur in the view that the unexplained  part  of the produc- 
tivity increase, which they estimate at  just over 6 percentage  points, is 
largely  due  to production  being  discontinued  at the less efficient  plants.65 
This is consistent with the improvement  seen in their utilization-cor- 
rected productivity  index for the period from 1980:1  to 1981:2  when 
manufacturing  output  was falling  rapidly. 
IMPROVING  EFFICIENCY 
Since the Tories came to power in 1979  there has been a shift in the 
balance  of industrial  bargaining  power  away  from  the unions  and  toward 
management.  This came about partly through legislation restricting 
union  immunities,  partly  through  intentional  neglect by the government 
of the unions as participants  in the discussion and design of macroeco- 
nomic and industrial  policy, and partly  because of the unpopularity  of 
organized labor since the 1978-79 "winter of discontent." Further 
changes along the same lines are expected. To the extent that it was 
union resistance to the introduction  of more efficient work practices 
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rather than managerial  ignorance or incompetence that forced the 
economy  to a position  well  inside  the  technological  production  possibility 
frontier,  such a weakening  of union  veto power will permit  an increase 
in productivity. 
It is important  that  the weakening  of union  power  is a function  of the 
change in the legal and institutional  framework  rather  than merely a 
reflection  of the depressed  state of economic  activity. If these gains  can 
be made permanent  only by keeping  the economy at the current,  very 
low level of capacity utilization, the costs are likely to outweigh the 
benefits. There is considerable  empirical  evidence, both anecdotal  and 
casual, that not all gains  from  reducing  overmanning,  ending  restrictive 
practices,  introducing  a more  flexible  use of labor  within  the enterprise, 
and  the like are "cyclically reversible." For example, labor  and capital 
resources still employed in the British  Steel Corporation,  British  Ley- 
land,  and  British  Airways  are  being  used  more  productively,  and  a return 
to previous  levels of inefficiency  appears  unlikely. 
There can be no doubt  that there was and is scope for improvement 
in productivity  in many industries  in the United Kingdom, even with 
existing capital and labor resources./' Weakening  the ability of orga- 
nized labor to resist changes in work practices, in the organization  of 
production, and in manning  levels may be a necessary condition for 
achieving  some of the potentially  available  gains in productivity;  but it 
is unlikely to be sufficient. Poor management  and lack of cooperation 
between management  and workers  are two other reasons for industrial 
inefficiency  in the United Kingdom,  and  they have not been the focus of 
any concerted  government  policies and  actions. 
COMPARISONS  WITH  THE  PAST 
Whether  recent performance  constitutes a productivity  revolution 
depends, in part, on the period  with which it is compared.  The spurt  in 
productivity  since 1980-output per person rose 2.1 percent  a year for 
the entire economy and 4.4 percent a year in manufacturing  between 
1980  and 1982-compares favorably  with the trend  prevailing  between 
the two previous output  peaks, 1973  and 1979.  However, not only is it 
66. See A. D. Smith,  D. M. W. N. Hitchens,  and  S. W. Davies,  International  Industrial 
Productivity:  A  Comparison  of Britain,  America  and  Germany,  National  Institute  of 
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inappropriate  to measure  a new trend  from the last two or three years, 
for reasons we have discussed above, but the 1973-79 trend is a poor 
bench mark  because of developments that made productivity  growth 
then  unusually  slow. 
The annual growth rates experienced in the period from the pre- 
OPEC  peak of 1973  to the pre-Thatcher  peak in 1979  were as follows: 
output  per person  employed  in the entire  economy, 0.88 percent;  nonoil 
GDP  per  person  employed,  0.33 percent;  output  per  worker  in manufac- 
turing,  0.80 percent;  and output  per person  hour  in manufacturing,  1.18 
percent.67  However, the cyclical position of the economy was different 
in the two final  years of the period.  The unemployment  rate  stood at 2.6 
percent in 1973  and at 5.1 percent in 1979. Unfilled  vacancies stood at 
306,700  in 1973  and 241,300  in 1979,  and average  weekly hours  worked 
by operatives in manufacturing  were 3 percent higher  in 1973  than in 
1979.  Even allowing  for shifts  in the natural  rate,  there  can  be little  doubt 
that  capacity  utilization  was higher  in 1973  than  in 1979. 
Equally important,  trend fitting  between 1973  and 1979  ignores the 
downward  shift in the level of cyclically adjusted  productivity  that  both 
economic theory and the data suggest occurred  between 1973  and 1975 
as a result of the unanticipated  increase in the real price of energy in 
1973-74.  A similar  but  smaller  downward  step  adjustment  in  productivity 
appears  to have occurred  after  the second OPEC  oil-price  shock  in 1979- 
80. All this suggests that productivity  growth between 1973  and 1979 
was unusually  low and that  the period  is unrepresentative  of underlying 
trends. 
The contrast  between  the 1973-79  period  and  the period  immediately 
preceding  the first  OPEC  shock is striking.  As already  noted, output  per 
person employed rose by an average  of 3.2 percent a year in the entire 
economy from 1966  to 1973  and by 4.4 percent  a year in manufacturing 
over the same period. These are similar to the productivity gains 
experienced  since 1980. 
If productivity  growth has returned  to pre-OPEC rates, there is a 
danger  that continued  contractionary  policy would lead to even higher 
levels of unemployment.  On the other hand, combined  with a recovery 
of demand,  a productivity  boom should help ease the conflict  between 
real  wage targets  and reality  and so relieve the inflationary  pressures. 
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Changing the Rules of the Game 
It is widely believed-not  least by the government-that the current 
approach  to the design and execution of macroeconomic  policy repre- 
sents  a radical  departure  from  conventional  post-World  War  II practice. 
In one interpretation  the current  government  is seen as denying  any 
need to use activist demand-management  policies to achieve full em- 
ployment because the self-equilibrating  tendencies of the economic 
system are strong enough and fast enough to make any stabilization 
policy redundant.  In our view such a new classical macroeconomics 
perspective  emphasizing  simple (preferably  fixed or open-loop)  policy 
rules for the government  to enhance the predictability  of future  policy 
actions does not properly  characterize  the thinking  of the government 
or most of its advisers.68 
According to our interpretation  the government  recognized that it 
must  deal  with  strategic  behavior  by agents  in  the private  sector. Without 
denying  the scope in principle  for stabilization  policy, it concluded  that 
the private sector, and especially organized  labor, would respond to 
activist  stabilization  rules  in such a way that  both runaway  inflation  and 
ever growing  fiscal imbalances  would result. 
To borrow the language  of game theory, the 1944 White Paper on 
unemployment  acknowledged  that the objectives of full employment, 
price stability, and productivity  growth could only be achieved as a 
cooperative solution to the government-union-management  "game," 
given the institutional  structure of labor markets. But the Thatcher 
government appears to have concluded, first, that the unions have 
progressively  exploited the government's  commitment  to maintain  full 
employment  by reneging  on their  sometimes  explicit  but  mostly implicit 
part  of the social contract  to exercise wage restraint  and  to facilitate  the 
introduction  of new technology and improved  working  practices. Sec- 
ond, the government  seems to have concluded  that no commitment  by 
the unions  to support  a cooperative  equilibrium  would  be credible. 
Stabilization  policy, in this view, had thus degenerated  into accom- 
modation of wage and price pressures, underwriting  of increasingly 
uncompetitive  firms  and  industries  through  domestic  demand  pressure, 
68. For an example  of the new classical macroeconomics,  see the memorandum  by 
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and  provision  of direct  subsidies  of various  kinds.  Furthermore,  incomes 
policies-attempts  to enforce certain aspects of the cooperative solu- 
tion-were  bound to be unsuccessful because they supplied neither 
sufficient  sticks nor carrots, and because of the cumulative  distortions 
they introduced  in the resource allocation  mechanism  and the relative 
earnings  structure. 
The  government's  response  to the  perceived  failure  of the cooperative 
solution, and the danger that the authorities  would end up passively 
following organized labor's leader, was to take the drastic step of 
discarding  not just passive accommodation  but the entire notion of 
stabilization.  Instead, it adopted a "credible threat" strategy by an- 
nouncing  fixed, open-loop  paths  for monetary  and  fiscal  instruments  and 
giving  the unions  a credible  commitment:  "you break  it, you own it." 
Such a strategy  represented  a major  departure  from  past practice  by 
postwar governments of any political bent. But the credibility  of the 
implicit  threat to those settling wages and prices in the private sector 
was not enhanced by the initial 25 percent increase in public sector 
earnings  nor by the wayward  behavior  of the chosen monetary  target. 
Any skepticism about the seriousness of the government's  intentions 
has, however, been dissolved by its willingness to tolerate or even 
encourage  levels of unemployment  that would in the past have caused 
the authorities  to ease monetary  policy, engineer  a fiscal stimulus, or 
both.  This, rather  than  the achievement  of its intermediate  targets  (which 
in the case of ?M3 was significantly  overshot) has established the 
credibility  of the government's  anti-inflation,  nonaccommodating  poli- 
cies. 
One of the undoubted  costs of this achievement has been that the 
government  has rejected the idea of managing  the economy at a time 
when the United Kingdom, in common with many other Western 
countries, is in a prolonged slump. Moreover, to the extent that the 
Thatcher  experiment  is found worthy  of emulation  overseas, the likeli- 
hood of any concerted, deliberate  expansion  is reduced, thus ensuring 
that the Western  world will be left increasingly  to those natural  forces 
whose failure  to ensure high employment  led to the birth  of Keynesian 
macroeconomics  in the first  place. 
If, nevertheless, credibility  has by now been achieved, will further 
reductions  in the rate  of inflation  be less costly than  the earlier  ones that 
took place before the investment  in credibility  began  to yield a return? 
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that  has been achieved  is a general  rather  than  a specific  credibility.  The 
threat  of nonaccommodation,  as Tobin  argues  in his evidence presented 
to the Treasury  Committee,  is "a threat  to everyone in general  and no- 
one in particular."  If organized  labor  were unified  and in control of its 
rank  and file and its shop stewards, such a policy could pay dividends. 
As it is, it may still appear quite safe for relatively small groups of 
workers to play the traditional  game without taking into account the 
macroeconomic  constraints  that the authorities  have imposed on the 
economy as a whole. This applies  both to "unwarranted"  wage claims 
and  to resistance  to productivity-enhancing  innovations.  The combined 
effect of decentralized,  uncoordinated  union pressures (or resistance) 
meeting unconditional  monetary  and fiscal targets with a deflationary 
bias is likely to be a continuing  recession. 
The dilemma facing the authorities is a real one.  How can the 
government  achieve the benefits from conditionality,  flexibility, and 
responsiveness in policy design without sliding into the position of 
simply  accommodating  pressures  exerted  by  groups  in  the  private  sector, 
a posture from which it may be difficult to recover while retaining 
popularity,  as both Edward Heath and James Callaghan  discovered? 
The answer appears  to lie either in credible commitments  from social 
partners  who have strategic  power, or in the reduction  of this power vis 
a vis that of the government,  so that the government  can then act as a 
dominant  player. Given the authorities'  unwillingness  to consider co- 
operative solutions in the past, a policy of weakening  the bargaining 
power of labor has provided  the only means of creating  the conditions 
for noninflationary  growth. Though we would prefer the pursuit of 
cooperative  solutions  to "  stagflation,  " with  credible  commitments  from 
organized  labor, the redistribution  of industrial  and economic power 
under current policies, which is still continuing, may already have 
proceeded  to the point at which demand  can be substantially  expanded 
without  adverse consequences for inflation  or real  labor  costs. 
Conclusions 
The behavior  of the British  economy since our  previous  BPEA  paper 
on the first  two years of the Thatcher  experiment  has confirmed  some of 
the tentative conclusions we reached in 1981. There is nothing  in the 
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the view that establishing  the credibility  of an anti-inflationary  policy is 
by itself sufficient  to achieve a desired reduction  in inflation  without 
appreciable  costs in the  form  of increased  unemployment  and  lost output 
even if it makes  these costs lower  than  they would  otherwise  have been. 
It is still  too early  to know the consequences  for trend  productivity  of 
the government's  macroeconomic  and supply-side  policies.  Rapid  growth 
of labor  productivity  since 1980,  especially  in manufacturing,  has taken 
place against  a background  of declining  or stagnant  output,  and  conflict- 
ing interpretations  abound. 
The most dramatic  departure  of the Thatcher  administration's  ap- 
proach  to economic policy design  from  that of all other  postwar  admin- 
istrations  was its decision to no longer formulate  economic policy in 
terms  of the pursuit  of ultimate  objectives  such  as employment,  inflation, 
or output,  but  to focus instead  on intermediate  financial  targets.  How, if 
at all, these targets  were to be revised  in the light  of changes  in economic 
circumstances  was never made  explicit. 
Whatever  the initial  intention,  the MTFS  has progressively  become a 
strategy  for fiscal contraction  as the PSBR targets, initially  said to be 
secondary  to the monetary  targets,  have come to dominate  the design  of 
macroeconomic  policy.69  The PSBR  targets  have thus  far  been achieved 
by cutting  capital  formation  in the public  sector and  by imposing  a large 
increase  in the average  direct  plus indirect  tax burden.70  Current  public 
spending  on goods and services has continued  to grow in real terms. If 
future PSBR targets are to be met, and if the government's  declared 
intention of reducing the tax burden is to be realized, future cuts in 
transfer  payments  (pensions, unemployment,  and illness benefits)  or in 
current exhaustive spending (health, defense, and education) appear 
inevitable. 
A principal  function of the MTFS has been, as we see it, to free the 
government  from commitments  that it believed implied  passive accom- 
modation  of inflationary  wage-price  trends. It has served that purpose: 
the government's  willingness  to pay any price  to fight  inflation  has been 
demonstrated,  and inflation  has been sharply  reduced. It is a mistake, 
however, to think  that continued  success involves unswerving  commit- 
ment to a program  for intermediate  targets conceived in the first few 
69. There  is some  evidence  to suggest  that  broad  monetary  targets  were  first  introduced 
in 1975  at least in part  with the intention  of limiting  the potential  for fiscal expansion  at 
fixed  interest  rates. See Fforde, "Setting  Monetary  Objectives." 
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months  of office. The government  has, as Fforde explained,  preserved 
its anti-inflationary  reputation  while relaxing  its monetary  targets,  much 
as Paul  Volcker  has done in the United States. What  is now required  is 
a similar  adjustment  of the fiscal targets that were not intended  to be 
immutable  in the first place. It is the credibility  of results, and not of 
intermediate  targets  designed to produce  them, that the prime  minister 
should work for, as it is by these results that her performance  will 
ultimately  be  judged.71 
The  government  has achieved, albeit  at a high  cost, a major  reduction 
in inflation,  having  significantly  weakened  the power  of labor  to achieve 
real  wage increases  in excess of the growth  of productivity  and  to resist 
changes  in  work  practices  and  the introduction  of new technology.  Now, 
with idle labor, capital, and managerial  resources in unprecedented 
abundance  and with a large and very contractionary  structural  budget 
surplus,  the main  risk  is that the sustained  recovery  that is possible will 
abort through lack of effective demand. Slow growth in the world 
economy  will limit  the contribution  made  by external  demand  at a given 
real  exchange  rate,  and  the world  recession  may  limit  the extent  to which 
"competitive depreciation" will be possible. Hence the growth of 
demand  will have to be generated  in large  part  domestically.  The public 
sector  is in a position  to provide  the required  stimulus  by bringing  about 
a "supply-side-friendly"  fiscal expansion with sufficient  monetary  ac- 
commodation  to prevent an appreciation  of the currency  and a rise in 
short-term  interest rates.72  This can be accomplished  without violating 
the canons of fiscal sustainability  and without threatening  the anti- 
inflationary  gains. 
Unless this expansion of  demand takes place, any potential re- 
naissance  in productivity  will either  merely  add  to the dole queue  or fail 
to materialize  for lack of investment. An increase in supply potential 
without  an increase  in demand  may, like faith without  charity,  come to 
nothing. 
71. See Thomas Schelling, "Establishing  Credibility:  Strategic Considerations," 
American  Economic  Review,  vol.  72 (1982), pp. 72-80;  and James Tobin in Monetary 
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72. See, for example, Bryan Hopkin, Marcus Miller, and Brian Reddaway, "An 
Alternate  Economic  Strategy-A Message  of Hope," Cambridge  Journal  of Economics, 
vol. 6 (March  1982),  pp. 85-103; and Rudiger  Dornbusch  and others, "Macroeconomic 
Prospects  and Policies for the European  Community,"  CEPS  Paper 1 (Brussels:  Centre 
for European  Policy Studies, April 1983);  and Institute  for International  Economics, 
Promoting  World Recovery:  A Statement  on Global Economic  Strategy  (Washington, 
D.C.: IIE, December  1982). Comments 
and Discussion 
Jeffrey D. Sachs: When  Willem  Buiter  and  Marcus  Miller  first  analyzed 
the Thatcher  experiment  at the Brookings  Panel meeting in 1981, the 
heaviest costs of disinflation  had already been borne in the United 
Kingdom, but few of the benefits were yet apparent.  Inflation  in mid- 
1981  was about 12 percent, not far from the rate when Thatcher  took 
office, though  admittedly  it was a rate far below the peak rate of more 
than 20 percent (1980:2)  that had been reached as a result of external 
shocks and  domestic  policy mistakes.  At the same time, unemployment 
had doubled between 1979:2  and 1981:2, to a rate of 10.4 percent. In 
those circumstances,  there was little basis for a cost-benefit  analysis of 
Thatcher's  policies; the costs were plainly  enormous, and few benefits 
were anywhere in sight. Thus Buiter-Miller,  round 1, focused on the 
causes of the depression  and  not on its ostensiblejustification  or positive 
returns. 
On the surface  at least, much has changed  in the United Kingdom's 
economy since that paper was written. Thatcher partisans now find 
vindication in the government's macroeconomic  policies in two key 
areas:  inflation  control  and  productivity  growth.  According  to table 2 in 
the Buiter-Miller  paper,  the retail-price-index  inflation  has declined  to a 
mere 4.6 percent in 1983:1, which if continued for a year would be 
Britain's best inflation  performance  since 1968. On the productivity 
front, output per worker in manufacturing  grew 17.2 percent during 
1980:4-1983:  1, by far  the fastest growth  since 1973.  Also, the aggregate 
output  decline ended in 1981,  and  the United Kingdom's  real  GDP  grew 
1.2 percent  in 1982,  at a time when total output  in the United States and 
Germany  declined. Unemployment  has stabilized  as well, though  at the 
astronomical  rate  of 12.5  percent  of the labor  force. 
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Now,  at least, it begins to make sense to compare the costs and 
benefits of Thatcher's  macroeconomic  policies, and Buiter and Miller 
devote a good part of their paper  to that exercise. To their credit, the 
authors  try to be exceedingly  fair in their calculations,  considering  the 
issues from many points of view.  But to their detriment, they are 
somewhat  casual  in their  procedures.  The authors  do not specify or test 
any of their own econometric  equations, though  they give a summary 
description  of many  studies  by other  authors.  I believe that  more  careful 
empirical  work will show much  of the gain in inflation  and productivity 
to date is probably  unsustainable  if the economy returns  to full employ- 
ment. In a word, the gains  are  probably  in large  part  the one-shot  effects 
of a move to Depression-level unemployment  rather than a sign of 
structural  rejuvenation. 
Most structural  models of wages, prices, and unemployment  show 
that changes in inflation are negatively related to both the level of 
unemployment  and the change in unemployment.  A typical reduced 
form is 
(1)  Pt  =  Pt_I  -  a(Ut  -  UN)  -  bUt. 
According  to my equation  1, a change  in inflation  between  time zero and 
T can be attributed  to two factors: the cumulative  unemployment  in 
excess  of  the  natural rate between  t  =  1 and t  =  T; and the  rise in 
unemployment  between zero and T: 
T 
(2)  PT  _  PO  =  -a  ,  (  Ut  -  UN) -  b( UT -  UO)- 
t=  1 
For  policy purposes  it is crucial  to know  how much  of a given  disinflation 
has come from the two parts, for only the first piece represents a 
sustainable  gain  in inflation  assuming  that  policy would  like to move the 
economy back  to its initial  level of unemployment.  The "sacrifice  ratio" 
should be  calculated as  1/a because that measures the cumulative 
unemployment  (above UN)  that  must  be endured  to reduce  permanently 
the inflation  rate by 1 percentage point, assuming that the economy 
begins  and  ends the adjustment  path  at the natural  rate;  that  is, UO  =  UT 
=  UN. When Buiter and Miller calculate a sacrifice  ratio of 2.3 (20.2 
cumulative  points of unemployment  since 1979,  with an 8.8 point slow- 
down in inflation),  they implicitly  assume that all of the disinflation  is 
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T 
l/a=  -  ,(U,-  UN)I(PT 
-  PO). 
t=  1 
This calculation  makes sense only if b  0. When b > 0 and UT >  UO, 
the calculation  clearly  understates  the true sacrifice  ratio. 
There is reason to believe that most of Britain's inflation  gains in 
recent years is due to the change  effect rather  than the level effect. To 
make this point, one must look closely at the coefficients a and b in 
equation 1 to understand  the sources of the rate-of-change  effect. A 
standard  derivation  of this equation  includes  the following  elements for 
the Phillips  curve, the variable  markup  equation,  consumer  prices, and 
terms  of trade,  respectively: 
(3)  Wt  =  PCtl  -  +(Ut  -  UN) 
pt  =  Wt  -  0 Ut  +  ppR 
Pc,  =  XP  +  (1 -X)(E  + P,*) 
'Tr=  P,  -  E -  P*, 
where 
W =  hourly compensation 
Pc  =  consumer price index 
Ut=  aggregate unemployment rate 
P  =  price of domestic output 
pR  =  real  price of intermediate  input 
E  =  nominal exchange rate 
rr,=  final-good  terms  of trade. 
After  a bit of manipulation  one finds 
(4)  Pc,  = 
Pc_I 
-  ](U,  -  UN)  -  0U  -  (1 -  X)i,  +  ppR. 
Comparing  my equations 1 and 4, one can see that the level effect is 
related  to the coefficient  on unemployment  in  the Phillips  curve  equation. 
The rate-of-change  effect is tied to the markup  coefficient  on the price 
equation.  That  is, as output  falls (or  unemployment  rises) profit  margins 
are  squeezed  and  inflation  is reduced.  Since  profit  margins  expand  during 
a recovery, this gain  is temporary. 
There is also a terms-of-trade  or competitiveness  effect on inflation. 
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through  them, the consumer  price index. This effect is also of the rate- 
of-change  rather  than level variety, because a terms-of-trade  improve- 
ment (or "loss in competitiveness," which sounds less wholesome) 
tends to accompany  a change in the level of money tightness and thus 
output, and because policy-induced  real exchange rate appreciations 
must typically be reversed in order to return  to a sustainable  current 
account  position. 
Some standard  models of output  and inflation  have J > 0 and 0 = 0, 
where the latter  assumption  is of pricing  at a fixed markup  over normal 
costs. Probably  the opposite set of assumptions  is better  for the United 
Kingdom. That is,  real wage growth has been largely invariant to 
unemployment,  but  profit  margins  have been highly  sensitive  to the level 
of unemployment.  The insensitivity  of real wage growth  to unemploy- 
ment has been documented  in a variety of ways, and in a variety of 
studies. In a recent  BPEA paper  I pointed  out that the annual  growth  in 
real  hourly  compensation  in the United Kingdom  was the same in 1973- 
81 as in 1960-73, despite the enormous  rise in unemployment  between 
the two periods (specifically, W -  Pc is 3.7 percent for 1960-73; 3.7 
percent for 1973-79; and 3.8 percent for 1979-81).1 My econometric 
wage equation  in that  paper  also showed 4  0. Using a slightly  different 
framework,  Grubb,  Jackman,  and Layard  recently ranked  the United 
Kingdom  as having  the  greatest  real  wage  rigidity  (essentially,  the lowest 
4) among  nineteen  OECD economies, and their  econometric  work also 
found a small  and statistically  insignificant  value of 4.2  Finally, there is 
a long tradition  in the United Kingdom,  following the work of Sargan, 
showing  that  the United  Kingdom's  real  wages  rather  relentlessly  pursue 
an exponentially  growing  real wage target.  This type of equation  helps 
to explain the rebound  in real wages in 1978  and 1979  after three years 
of Labour  party  incomes policies. The enormous  burst  in real wages in 
1978-79 would otherwise be difficult  to explain, since it occurred at 
extremely  high  rates  of unemployment. 
On the other hand, the capacity of high unemployment  to squeeze 
profit  margins  has been well documented.  The fact that the "cyclically 
1. Jeffrey D. Sachs, "Real Wages and Unemployment  in the OECD Countries," 
BPEA, 1:1983, pp. 255-89. 
2. Dennis Grubb,  Richard  Jackman,  and Richard  Layard, "Wage Rigidity  and Un- 
employment  in OECD Countries,"  European  Economic  Review, vol. 21 (March-April 
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adjusted  labor share of value added" has risen enormously  is another 
way of stating  that  the markup  of prices  over normal  unit-labor  costs has 
been substantially  reduced since 1973, and particularly  since 1979. In 
my recent paper, I estimated  the current  squeeze of the markup  to be 
between 19  and  25 percent  of its 1965-69 level. 
A regression  of my reduced-form  equation  4 above strongly  supports 
the rate-of-change  rather  than  level hypothesis.  The regression  equation 
amends  4 by adding  a term, INC,  to pick up the effects of the Labour 
government  incomes policies during 1974-79. The results are, with t- 
statistics  in parentheses,3 
(5a)  Pc,  =  1.5  +  0.89Pc,_  -  1.29 Ut  +  1.19 Ut1 
(2.13)(12.25)  (-2.97)  (2.28) 
+  0.78  PRMt  -  3.78  INC,  -0.  W_  I 
(4.01)  (-3.95)  (-2.00) 
R2  =  0.91, Durbin-Watson  =  2.07, p =  -0.53  (-2.04). 
or 
(Sb)  Pc1  -  PC,,  =  1.07  -  1.45 Ut +  1.24 Ut_ 
(1.55)(- 3.27)  (2.24) 
+  0.67PRMt  -  4.26INCt  -  0.16,rti 
(3.50)  (-4.44)  (-1.93) 
K2  =  0.82, Durbin-Watson  =  2.17, p =  -  0.53 (-  2.17). 
In equation 5a, the level effect is -0.10,  that is,  -  1.29 +  1.19, while 
the rate-of-change  effect is -  1.19, or twelve times as large.  In equation 
Sb,  which imposes a unit  coefficient  on lagged  inflation  as in 1  above, the 
level effect is - 0.21, or -  1.45 +  1.24, compared  with a rate-of-change 
effect of  -  1.24, or six times as large. According to Sb, the rise in 
unemployment  between 1979  and 1982  (6.9 percentage  points)  accounts 
for an 8.9 percentage  point drop in inflation,  while the terms-of-trade 
3. The terms of trade  for final  goods in the United Kingdom  are expressed  as 7r,  and 
are measured  as the United Kingdom's  wholesale price index relative to a weighted- 
average  wholesale  price  index  of the industrial  economies  (expressed  in pounds  sterling); 
PRM is the real price of imported  intermediate  inputs  for the industrial  economies as a 
whole, measured  as the unit value of imports  relative  to the unit  value of exports;  INC is 
a dummy  variable  for incomes  policies, equal  to 1 in 1974, - 1 in 1976-77, 1 in 1978-79, 
and zero elsewhere. All data except INC are from the International  Monetary  Fund, 
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improvement  of 27.7 percent between 1978  and 1981  explains another 
4.4 percent fall in inflation.  (Note that I consider rrt  in 1978  and 1981, 
since Trt  in 5a is entered  with a lag.) Put more graphically,  according  to 
5a and 5b, a return  to unemployment  of a "mere" 6 percent from the 
current  12.5  percent  would add  about  8 percentage  points to the current 
inflation  rate! 
This basic view that the underlying  gains have been far less than the 
apparent  gains is also supported  by a wide range of forecasts by the 
government,  the Organization  for Economic  Cooperation  and  Develop- 
ment, and private analysts. The OECD, for example, has recently 
forecast that inflation  and unemployment  in the United Kingdom  will 
remain  unchanged  from 1983  to 1984  (at 6.0 and 12.5 percent, respec- 
tively), even though the unemployment  rate is far above its historical 
average. Such a forecast simply  reflects  the view that rising  unemploy- 
ment, and not merely high unemployment,  stands behind the recent 
gains. 
Turning  very briefly  to productivity,  I note that  the recent  productiv- 
ity gains seem to have the same reversible character  as the inflation 
gains. As I pointed  out in my last BPEA  article, an economic downturn 
perceived  to be permanent  should  raise measured  productivity,  as least- 
efficient  firms  and workers  are booted out of the productivity  data. The 
standard,  and contrary, notion that productivity  is procyclical results 
from  the fact that  until  recent  years, economic downturns  were thought 
to be transient  affairs,  giving  strong  incentive to firms  to hoard  labor  in 
the cyclical trough.  Prime  Minister  Thatcher's  main  accomplishment  in 
this  regard  seems to have  been  to convince  firms  that  high  unemployment 
and slow growth  will be present  for the long haul. 
The British productivity "miracle" has been replicated in several 
other  high-unemployment  countries  in the OECD. Belgian  productivity 
growth  in manufacturing  ranks second only to Japan's  during  1973-81 
(among  the largest  eleven OECD  economies),  in  the period  when  Belgian 
unemployment  rose from 2.8 percent in 1973  to 14.8 percent in 1983. 
Similarly,  in the Netherlands,  with 15.5 percent unemployment,  there 
has also been a productivity  boom  relative  to the other  OECD  countries. 
To the extent that labor-shedding  in least-efficient  firms  explains the 
current  surge  in the United Kingdom's  productivity,  it is hard  to see how 
the productivity  boom could be sustained  if the economy were to return 
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to the same plant and equipment  from which they came. In fact, the 
Thatcher depression has done much to restrict the growth of that 
industrial  capacity  in the past  two years, to the point  at which  the OECD 
has recently concluded that the United Kingdom's capital stock in 
manufacturing  has actually  declined 1.7 percent  since 1980.4 
I do not want to pretend that doubts do not remain about future 
performance  of the United  Kingdom.  Perhaps  Thatcher  will yet succeed 
in changing union and management  attitudes and thus contribute to 
greater  efficiency and growth. (In technical  jargon, the inflation  equa- 
tions may not stand up to the Lucas critique.)  My point is rather  that 
such beneficent  effects are not really yet in sight and certainly  do not 
follow from the observed gains in inflation  and productivity  to date. If 
such attitudes  had been changed, manufacturing  real wages would not 
now be over 20 percent  above a full-employment  level, and the produc- 
tivity miracle  would have come with rising  rather  than falling  employ- 
ment. A defense of the policies requires a showing that economic 
behavior has changed, not just that inflation  and productivity  growth 
look good at 12  percent  unemployment. 
William H. Branson: This second installment  of Buiter and Miller  on 
the  Thatcher  experiment  provides  a thorough  and  interesting  description 
of the facts and exposes several important  ambiguities  in the interpre- 
tation of exactly what the experiment  was. Why has sterling  been so 
strong?  Was money really  tight?  Does the "wage gap" reflect  real  wage 
rigidity?  Most  interesting  is the suggestion  that,  perhaps  unintentionally, 
the Thatcher  government  achieved a deep recession and disinflation  by 
application  of standard  Keynesian  fiscal  policy. The  government  thought 
that to control money growth  the public sector borrowing  requirement 
had to be reduced, so the budget was tightened. This fiscal squeeze 
produced  a recession, but no control over money growth. This looks 
like a case of misapplication  of a standard  financial  program  of the 
International  Monetary  Fund for a developing country, where budget 
deficits are automatically  monetized. This surely is not the case in the 
United Kingdom. 
The paper is especially interesting because it provides tempting 
4. Organization  for Economic Cooperation  and Development, OECD Economic 
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puzzles that lead readers  to wonder whether  they can come up with a 
reasonable  model  that  explains  these results.  In this discussion  I provide 
one or two such explanations. I begin with the problem of why has 
sterling  been so strong. I then shift the focus to the domestic economy 
of the United Kingdom,  characterize  the stance of policy (was fiscal or 
monetary  policy tight or loose?), and interpret  the relation between 
unemployment  and the wage gap. I finish with a brief evaluation of 
policy. 
Sterling  has gone through  a period  of unusual  appreciation,  which  has 
put  a severe profit  squeeze on the tradable  goods sector. The facts were 
summarized  in the first BPEA  paper on the Thatcher  government  by 
Buiter  and Miller,  and in table 3 here. Before proceeding,  I should  note 
that  while the exchange rate, E, and competitiveness, C, are defined  in 
the text in the usual  way as home currency  per unit  of foreign  exchange, 
their  inverses are shown in the tables. And the lowercase e and c in the 
text are  the natural  logarithms  of E and  C. The nominal  effective sterling 
exchange rate appreciated  fairly steadily from 82.4 (1975 =  100) in 
1979:1  to 101.8 in 1981:1, and then fell to 80.5 by 1983:1. The latter 
observation  is in table 3. Although  the nominal  rate went through  a full 
cycle, the rate  of inflation  in the United Kingdom  was well above that  of 
the rest of the OECD, so the real  exchange  rate, defined  with unit-labor 
costs, rose from 99.5 in 1979:  1 to 155.6  in 1981:  1, and declined only to 
143.2  by 1982:3.  This amounts  to a loss in competitiveness  of nearly  50 
percent! 
Buiter  and Miller  make more of a puzzle of this loss of competitive- 
ness, or "misalignment,"  of sterling  than  is necessary. They present  an 
arbitrage  condition  for the log of the nominal  effective exchange rate, 
e(t), in equation  1. Expected inflation  and real  interest  rates do not play 
a role in this equation. These are introduced  in equation  2 for the real 
effective exchange rate, c(t). This equation  tells us that a large  fall in c 
(its inverse is shown in table 3) should  result  from  the expected real  rate 
of interest in the United Kingdom being higher than the  "world" 
expected  real  rate.  In table  4 the reverse  was true  for ex post real  interest 
rates until the end of  1981. This contradiction  leads the authors to 
despair,  reflecting  their "inability  to account satisfactorily  for much of 
the misalignment  of the pound  sterling.  " I think  one can  go a little  further 
than  this. 
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Table 1.  Changes in the Nominal Effective Pound Sterling Exchange Rate 
Equilibrium effective  Anticipated  Inflation  nominal rateb  nt  t  Nominal  effective 
differ-  Interest  rate (1978  =  100) 
ential  Change  Level  integr  al 
Year  (percent)a  (percent)  (1978 = 100)  (percent)c  Predictedd  Actluale 
1978  3.6  ...  100.0  ...  100.0  100.0 
1979  3.7  3.6  103.6  -  14.6  89.0  93.1 
1980  6.0  3.7  107.4  -  7.7  99.7  85.0 
1981  0.1  6.0  113.8  -5.1  108.7  85.3 
1982  1.3  0.1  113.9  -  1.9  112.0  89.6 
Source:  Author's  calculations. 
a.  United Kingdom less world. The inflation differential is the GDP deflator from table 2 in the Buiter-Miller paper 
less  the OECD inflation rate from Natiotnal Itistitlute Economic  Review,  no.  104 (May  1983). 
b.  The equilibrium nominal effective  rate is assumed  to follow  the realized inflation differential. 
c.  The interest differential is the world nominal interest  rate as calculated  by the authors less  the bank rate from 
their table 2. The differential for four years is assumed  to be anticipated,  with a zero expected  differential after 1982. 
The integral is expressed  as  ,(r*  -  r). 
d.  The predicted nominal rate is the sum of the third and fourth columns. 
e.  The actual nominal effective  rate is the inverse  of the sterling effective  exchange  rate from table 3, indexed  to 
1978 =  100. 
assumes that actual inflation  in the United Kingdom  was anticipated. 
This could hardly  have been the case for the inflationary  explosion of 
1979-80 after the Thatcher  government  came to power. The analysis 
also assumes that  the expected interest  differential  shifted  suddenly  and 
fully in late 1979. Alternative assumptions would recognize that the 
market  should have expected a program  of future monetary  tightness, 
and  expected it with a degree  of uncertainty. 
To see  the effect of assuming that the inflationary  outburst was 
unanticipated,  one can separate  the real expected interest  rate terms  in 
equation  2 into their  nominal  and  expected inflation  components  and set 
the expected inflation  differential  equal to zero. This assumes that the 
expected  inflation  in the United  Kingdom  was the average  for  the OECD. 
Now,  because that country's nominal rates were higher than world 
nominal  rates, at least the sign of the effect on competitiveness  is right. 
The magnitude  of the appreciation  can be checked for consistency 
with the assumption  that the inflationary  explosion was unanticipated 
by focusing on equation 1 and assuming  that the perceived  equilibrium 
nominal  rate followed the actual relative  price path. The calculation  is 
shown in my table 1 above. The third  column  gives the movement  in the 
equilibrium  nominal  effective  rate  (1978  = 100)  based  on this  assumption. 
The fourth column presents the cumulative  forward  nominal  interest 
differential  on the assumption  that  the four  years  from 1979  to 1982  were Willem H. Buiter and Marcus H.  Miller  375 
correctly  anticipated,  and that the expected differential  after 1982  was 
zero. The expected cumulative  nominal  differential  of 14.6 percent is 
near the value of 16 percent that Buiter and Miller cite in the text as 
being needed for the real interest differential  to explain the fall in 
competitiveness  in 1979-80. The predicted movement of the nominal 
effective rate  from  equation 1 and  from the above assumptions  is given 
in the fifth  column;  the actual  is given in the sixth. 
The predicted  path  of the fifth  column  shows a sudden  drop  to 89.0 in 
1979,  and  then  a gradual  movement  back  toward  the "equilibrium"  path, 
which itself is rising due to the inflation  differential.  This is the path 
predicted  by equation  1 if the shift  in interest  rate  expectations  is certain 
and comes fully in 1979. The actual path in the sixth column shows a 
more gradual  drop to 85.0 in 1980  and then a much slower rise. This 
would have produced the slower fall in the rate reflecting  the initial 
uncertainty;  the hesitant  recovery  reflected  expected  future  tightness  all 
along. 1 
So the magnitude  of the initial appreciation  of sterling is roughly 
consistent with the assumption  that the inflation  differential  was unan- 
ticipated, and the persistence of the "misalignment"  may reflect the 
market's continuing faith in the future tightness of monetary policy 
under the Thatcher  policy regime. While this story may simply be an 
attempt to "make this approach  consistent with the facts," it seems 
plausible and certainly fits the general outline of the Buiter-Miller 
analysis. 
Turning  now to the characterization  of policy, I note that  the shift to 
an extremely tight fiscal policy is well documented in the paper. By 
eliminating "built-in stabilizers" from the United Kingdom's fiscal 
structure,  the cyclically adjusted  budget changes since 1979 have in- 
creased  the surplus  each year, and  policy has been much  tighter  than  the 
OECD  average. 
The characterization  of monetary  policy is much  more  difficult.  One 
can  look at monetary  aggregates,  interest  rates,  or  investment  outcomes. 
As Buiter  and  Miller  remark,  the aggregates  give conflicting  signals.  The 
monetary  base grew  very slowly, but  broader  aggregates  generally  more 
1. The analysis  of expected future  policy is the same as that, for example,  presented 
in W. H. Buiter  and  M. H. Miller,  "Monetary  Policy  and  International  Competitiveness: 
The Problem  of Adjustment,"  Oxford  Economic  Papers, vol. 33 (July  1981,  supplement), 
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than  kept  up with  inflation.  Ex post real  interest  rates  were low and  then 
negative  in 1980. But if one incorporates  information  from the foreign 
exchange  market  and  assumes  that  the inflation  differential  was unantic- 
ipated, real interest rates become higher  by the amounts  shown in the 
first column of my table 1 above. On the other hand, real private 
investment  has been essentially flat since 1978  in the face of the GDP 
decline shown in Buiter and Miller's  figure 1. Thus I find it difficult  to 
take a strong  position on whether  money has actually  been tight  under 
the Thatcher  regime. 
A cautious characterization  of policy, then, is that fiscal policy was 
very tight, and monetary  policy was more or less neutral,  with a wide 
range of uncertainty around the latter  judgment. The recession was 
surely due to fiscal policy interacting  with a deep inventory  cycle. The 
important  insight  from  this  paper,  and  the  paper  they  cite by John  Fforde, 
is that the shift to tight  fiscal  policy was  justified  by the asserted  need to 
slow money growth.  This view was probably  reinforced  by the Interna- 
tional Monetary  Fund mission that preceded the election of the Con- 
servative government.  But in fact the relation  between the budget  and 
money  growth  is very loose and  money  continuously  overshot  the target 
paths. The ironic result is the application  of a very Keynesian anti- 
inflation  policy in the name  of monetarism. 
A view of the relation  between the "wage gap"-the  excess of the 
cumulation  of real wages over labor productivity  growth-and  unem- 
ployment  is important  for policy. Buiter  and Miller  show in their table 
15  a small  real  wage gap  from 1978  to 1981  in the entire  economy less oil, 
and  a gap  of about 10  percent  from 1978  to 1981  in manufacturing.  These 
estimates are smaller  than the previous ones of Sachs but larger  than 
those of Dornbusch  and others  for the European  Commission.2 
The wage gap of  10 percent can be interpreted  as an exogenous 
increase in the real wage, generating "classical" unemployment  of 
around  8  percent  or  600,000  from  1979  to the  end  of 1982  in  manufacturing, 
using an elasticity of substitution  of 0.8. This could give an increase in 
total unemployment  of approximately  2.5 percentage  points since 1978. 
This interpretation  could be used to  support a contention that the 
2. Jeffrey D. Sachs, "Real Wages and Unemployment  in the OECD Countries," 
BPEA, 1:1983,  pp. 255-89; and Rudiger  Dornbusch  and  others, "Macroeconomic  Pros- 
pects and Policies for the European  Community,"  CEPS Paper 1 (Brussels:  Centre  for 
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"natural"  rate of unemployment  in the United Kingdom  has risen to 8 
or 9 percent. 
An alternative interpretation,  provided by Robert Gordon in his 
exposition  of a "textbook"  model  in his comment  on Sachs's 1983  BPEA 
paper,  would  impute  the correlation  of the wage gap  and  unemployment 
to demand  fluctuations  with a sticky nominal  wage. As demand  falls, 
unemployment  rises along  with the real  product  wage. The appreciation 
of sterling  after 1978  would  strengthen  this relation  by reducing  the price 
level. According  to this interpretation,  the unemployment  is "Keynes- 
ian" and  can be treated  by demand  expansion. 
The choice between these alternative interpretations  depends on 
whether  the real wage or the nominal  wage is sticky downward  in the 
United Kingdom. My paper with Julio Rotemberg,  and the papers by 
Sachs, and by Grubb,  Layard,  and Jackman,  provide  weak support  for 
the sticky real  wage model  for the United  Kingdom.3  So I can agree  with 
the cautious  conclusion  of Buiter  and  Miller  that  a "margin"  of classical 
unemployment exists  that would be  hard to  eliminate by  demand 
expansion.  But if classical unemployment  is the margin,  demand  expan- 
sion will reduce  the inframarginal  Keynesian  unemployment. 
Finally, I turn  to the evaluation  of policy. Here I think  it is important 
to separate  the positive question  of whether  the analysis  was wrong  from 
the normative  question of whether  we agree with the Thatcher  govern- 
ment's weights on inflation  reduction  versus unemployment.  Buiter  and 
Miller note that the "sacrifice ratio" of cumulative  unemployment  to 
inflation  reduction  was 2.3 until  the end  of 1982.  In  table 13  the  Treasury's 
estimate of the sacrifice  ratio is reported  as being 2.5, which seems to 
have been approximately  correct.  The quoted  monetarists  were way off 
in their estimate, but they are not the government.  So it is hard  to fault 
the analysis  here. The government  was probably  surprised  by the depth 
of the recession. The March 1980  forecast of 1981-82 unemployment 
was 700 million  low. This was corrected  in the March  1981  forecast, and 
the outcome  has been as forecasted  since. Although  the government  was 
surprised  in 198  1, it simply  adjusted  the forecast  upward  and  proceeded. 
3. William  H. Branson  and  Julio  J. Rotemberg,  "International  Adjustment  with  Wage 
Rigidity,"  European  Economic  Review, vol. 13 (May 1980),  pp. 309-32; Sachs, "Real 
Wages  and Unemployment";  and  Dennis  Grubb,  Richard  Jackman,  and  Richard  Layard, 
"Wage  Rigidity  and Unemployment  in OECD  Countries,"  European  Economic  Review, 
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So although  the analysis seems correct  except for one surprise,  the lack 
of policy response to the unexpectedly  high  unemployment  reflects  the 
low weight given to unemployment  by the policymakers.  On this point 
I join Buiter and Miller in objecting  to the Thatcher  government's  ap- 
parent  indifference  to unemployment  and sole targeting  of inflation. 
The government  has confused the policy debate in the United King- 
dom by proclaiming  its adherence to monetarism  and its intention  to 
control  money  growth  while  pursuing  a  contractionary  Keynesian  policy. 
The confusion has probably been the source of the appreciation  of 
sterling  that has squeezed manufacturing  profits  severely. Clarity  about 
policy might  have prevented  this. 
Refusal to expand demand seems to be based on the overly strong 
assumption  that all the unemployment  increase  since 1978  is classical. I 
think that, as in the United States, now that inflation  has been greatly 
reduced, demand  should be expanded. Uncertainty  about the division 
of unemployment  between classical and Keynesian  suggests  packaging 
demand  expansion  with some give on real  wages to ensure  that  the result 
is a reduction  of unemployment. 
General  Discussion 
Stanley  Fischer  emphasized  that  Thatcher's  policies should  be viewed 
as a determined  attempt  to change the policy regime. Much of recent 
macroeconomic  theory predicts  that such a change would have caused 
shifts  of coefficients  in  economic  models  estimated  from  the  pre-Thatcher 
period. Fischer urged the authors to  perform econometric studies 
explicitly testing  for such coefficient  shifts. Furthermore,  he suggested 
it  was inappropriate  to draw  inferences  from  relations  such  as the  inflation 
equations  that are discussed unless the equations  could be shown to be 
unaffected  by the regime change. He also suggested that the Thatcher 
strategy  may have been the best one available  because incomes policies 
had been discredited  after  the last Labour  governments  had tried  to use 
them. Christopher  Sims  found  the authors'  measures  of monetary  policy 
stance less satisfactory  than their measures of fiscal policy stance. In 
particular,  he believed that the characterization  of monetary  policy by 
reference to the behavior  of aggregates  relative to their preannounced 
target paths was inadequate  as a measure of "tightness." From the 
level of real interest rates and the exchange rate, Sims concluded that Willem H. Buiter and Marcus H.  Miller  379 
the tight  monetary  policy as well as tight  fiscal policy were responsible 
for the length  and  depth  of the recession in the United Kingdom. 
Sims  also reasoned  that, if the measures  of fiscal  policy for the United 
States were adjusted  for inflation  in the same way Buiter  and Miller  had 
done for the United Kingdom,  they would show that U.S. fiscal policy 
tightened  in the first  years of the 1980s.  The U.S. recession would then 
be seen as a product  of tight fiscal and monetary  policies, at least in its 
early stages, and the contrast between the experience of the United 
Kingdom  and that of the United States would be less marked  than the 
authors  suggest. Benjamin  Friedman  agreed  and pointed  out that, on a 
full-employment  basis, even before  inflation  adjustment  the U.S. federal 
budget  showed very small  deficits in 1980  and 1982  and was actually  in 
surplus  in 1981. 
Several participants  disagreed with Jeffrey Sachs's analysis that 
expansionary  policies under the present circumstances  in the United 
Kingdom would mainly reignite the wage-price spiral that the deep 
recession had stopped. James Tobin reasoned that the degree of real 
wage rigidity  is likely to be inversely  related  to the unemployment  rate, 
so  that real wages could decline in present circumstances even  if 
expansion resumed. Robert  J. Gordon  attributed  the small effect esti- 
mated  for the level of unemployment  in Sachs's equation  to the main- 
tained hypothesis that the natural rate of unemployment has been 
constant  throughout  the period.  He believed  that  this assumption  biased 
downward  the estimated  effect of the level of unemployment  on real  and 
money  wages because  both  the unemployment  rate  and  the inflation  rate 
rose in 1973-76. Gordon  reported  that he had  found a large effect from 
the level of unemployment  on British  price behavior  when he allowed 
the natural  rate to shift to reflect structural  changes such as a more 
generous social security net. Marcus  Miller replied that there was no 
evidence of structural  changes of the sort that would suggest large 
increases had occurred in the natural  rate. Rather, a large rise in the 
natural  rate  was often inferred  by some researchers  as the simplest  way 
to explain the concurrent  rise in inflation  and unemployment  in the 
context of their  models. 